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1 Introduction
This Working Paper explores the system of provision (sop) for water in South Africa with
particular reference to finance and financialisation as part of the South Africa contribution to
Work Package 8 Task 6 case studies under the EU FP7 FESSUD grant (see Isaacs (2016) for
the Working Paper exploring the South African sop for housing and more detail on the national
context). The sop approach is based on the idea that sector outcomes emerge as a result of
relations between agents which are themselves embedded in historically evolved social and
economic structures and processes. This is in contrast with orthodox economic approaches
which view the world in terms of deviations from an idealized, market-like state. Originally
devised in connection with consumption studies, part of this FESSUD research programme
aims to extend the sop scope to consider public sector systems of provision with particular
reference to housing and water (for more on this see Bayliss, Fine and Robertson 2013).
One of the key principles of the sop approach is that consumption is not the spontaneous
outcome of decisions made by rational individuals but is inherently linked to the production
process  in  a  vertical  chain.  Agents  have  diverse  and  often  competing  interests  with
settlements highly contested, and contestations continue to evolve. For the sop approach,
each commodity has its own material culture which is unique in time and location. Outcomes
are therefore context-specific and the analysis is anchored in the real world.
When it comes to the provision of water, there are material factors which shape its delivery
and consumption. Water is heavy to transport and so is delivered by networks of pipes and
pumps; supply is typically monopolistic; it is essential for all life and therefore there is a
strong social element to the delivery system. When the geographical, historical and socio-
economic context are added, the result is a sop that is unique to South African water.
Water production in South Africa is stratified according to function in a system which is widely
known  as  the  water  “value  chain”  (see,  for  example,  Treasury  2014a).  This  describes  the
stages by which water production is  vertically  segregated.  “Raw water” is  abstracted from
surface or ground water. This can require pipes and pumps and dams or sometimes just uses
a borehole. In some cases this goes directly to the end user (for example with some irrigated
agriculture or large industrial users and mines) and much of it is consumed by bulk water
boards (WBs) which treat and transport the water to some end users and to Water Service
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Authorities (WSAs), many of which are municipalities who are responsible for provision to end
users including households. This is in contrast with vertically integrated water providers, as
for  example  in  England  and  Wales.  The  delineation  is  not  clear-cut  with  some  WBs  also
providing some municipal services and some municipalities obtaining their own bulk water
directly. However, this chapter, which explores the finance of the sector, is structured broadly
along these lines.
As currently deployed, South Africa’s water resources are barely sufficient to cover water
needs. Low rainfall combined with water-intensive energy production and a high reliance on
agriculture is placing the sector under enormous strain. Water resources are depleted further
with pollution from mining and industrial production. Climate change is expected to shrink
reserves still further. The country is significantly water-stressed with all resources used
almost to the maximum.
Since the end of apartheid, state investment has led to great progress in increasing access to
water and sanitation for black households and remedying the extreme inequality that
prevailed before 1994. However, while significant progress has been made, millions living in
rural  areas  and  in  informal  settlements  lack  access  to  basic  services.  The  allocation  of
resources in the sector still replicates the extensive inequalities that prevailed under
apartheid. Service delivery in South Africa continues to be split along the racial (and/or
parallel class) lines that dominated the apartheid era. Water is readily available for those that
have money. Hence, mines owned by wealthy global shareholders sit next to slum shacks
where households have little access to basic services.
There are three general themes that have shaped water policy since the end of apartheid.
First there has been an emphasis on addressing the extreme inequality that dominated the
apartheid regime. This has taken the form of government investment to roll out infrastructure
to poor areas as well  as policy initiatives to ensure that basic services are provided to the
poorest. Second, policy is informed by a neoliberal ethos with an emphasis on cost recovery,
on  ‘user  pays’  and  ‘demand  management’.  Scarcity,  both  in  terms  of  water  supplies  and
financing,  inform  this  approach  to  sector  policy.  Water  pricing  is  intended  to  reflect  the
economic value and shape resource allocation. Finally, services are intended to be
sustainable and self-financing at a local level (except where poor communities cannot afford
basic services, in which case government may subsidise construction but not the operation of
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services). Decentralisation of responsibilities to municipalities is intended to devolve decision
making to the local level to increase accountability.
In practice, these policies are contradictory and contested and the core objectives of equity
and sustainability have been compromised as a result. The vertically segregated production
structure combined with the philosophy of ‘user pays’ means that the large industries and
mines that are able to use raw water and bulk water directly,  do so at  a lower price than
households who are charged an additional mark up by their municipality. The additional costs
of further treating and processing water are added to water bills. The resulting structure has
a notional fairness on the grounds that costs are paid by the users of specific infrastructure
investments. However, this system treats all users equally, putting mines and industry on the
same footing as municipalities. The result is that households pay more for water than mining
companies as they are more costly to serve.
In terms of sustainability, there are two major weaknesses in the municipal water system.
First,  low  incomes  constrain  affordability.  Research  by  the  DWA  confirms  that  in  many
municipalities,  the  water  tariff  is  not  affordable  for  most  households.  The  result  is  that
extensive indebtedness permeates the system. Households struggle to pay municipalities and
these  have  high  levels  of  debt  owing  to  bulk  water  providers,  some of  which  are  close  to
collapse. Second, many municipalities do not have the capacity to manage water services with
some operating in crisis mode. Decentralisation initiatives have not been matched with skills
and resource transfer. The result is that government investment programmes are
constrained by the inability of some municipalities to disburse government grants. The
weakest municipalities are the most disadvantaged. Environmental sustainability is also
threatened by weak state capacity and continued water intensive mining practices.
Private finance, let alone financialisation is not a directly dominant feature of the sop in South
Africa, in that the financial sector is not heavily involved. Sector finance comes from the state
via taxation, from end users and there is some private sector financing. Bulk water providers
and  some  municipalities  raise  finance  from  the  private  sector  with  bond  issues.  A  few
municipalities have had concession contracts with private water companies for the
management of municipal service but the private sector has little involvement in the sop at
present.
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This Working Paper shows that there is a continued gap between the rhetoric of policy and
outcomes  in  practice.  While  great  progress  has  been  made  in  expanding  the  number  of
households connected to water services, millions have had their supplies disconnected for
failure to pay. Meanwhile, higher end users face little sanctions for luxury consumption. The
sector is undergoing considerable reform just now. The country’s 12 Water Boards are being
consolidated into nine Regional Water Utilities. The pricing strategy is being revised and
infrastructure investment is being planned. There is awareness in the Department for Water
Affairs  (DWA)  that  after  twenty  years,  the  impact  of  sector  policy  on  inequality  has  been
disappointing. However, for new initiatives to have a significant impact on this, there needs to
be more emphasis on integrated redistribution at the national level rather than just meeting
the basic needs of the poorest.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the context of water provision in
South Africa, looking at the geography and history of the water sop as well as the current legal
framework. Section 3 provides an overview of water consumption according to different users
showing that agriculture usage dominates but mining can have a significant impact on water
quality. There are then three sections on water production which traces the different stages
in the production process and the interface between them. Section 4 deals with the production
of raw water, section 5, bulk water provision and section 6 turns to municipalities and their
role in the water sop. Section 7 considers the nature of water consumption at the municipal
level and impact of social policy in redressing inequality before section 8 concludes.
2 Context
2.1 Geography
The population of South Africa is about 53 million across the country’s nine provinces. The
most populated are Gauteng (24%), KwaZulu-Natal (19.7%) and Eastern Cape (12.5%).1 The
country is categorized as highly water-stressed, 2  with  less  water  per  person  than
neighbouring countries widely considered to be much drier, such as Namibia and Botswana
(DWA 2013b). Water comes primarily from surface sources (77%) with 9% from ground water
and 14% reuse of return flows. Desalination is used on a small scale by industrial and mining
sectors (Hedden and Cilliers 2014). Average rainfall at 450mm pa is about 60% of the world’s
average (DWA 2013). The country experiences huge variations in temporal and spatial
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distribution  of  rainfall  (WWF  2014b).  It  also  has  one  of  the  lowest  ratios  of  mean  annual
precipitation (MAP) to mean annual run-off (MAR) in the world with only 9% of rainfall entering
the rivers compared with a global average of 31%. Climate change threatens to exacerbate
conditions further (DWA 3013c).
The country is close to the limit of water use with 98% of the country’s water supply already
allocated  and  shortages  predicted  in  the  future.  The  Department  of  Water  Affairs  (DWA)
estimates a shortfall in the water supply of 1.7% by 2025 (WWF 2014a). Eleven out of 19 water
catchment areas have a negative water balance. Many rural settlements have insufficient
water to meet their basic water demands and more water resources are needed (DWA 2013).
The country’s limited water supplies are further constrained by high levels of pollution and
environmental  degradation  with  40%  of  fresh  water  systems  in  a  critical  condition  (WWF
2014a; DWA 2013b, P.8). The main causes of pollution are mining (including coal mining),
urban development (salinity, nutrients, microbiological pollution), industry (chemicals and
toxins), agriculture (sediment, nutrients, agrochemicals, salinity through irrigation return
flows) and untreated or poorly treated wastewater (WWF 2014b).
A  further  challenge  to  the  already  precarious  situation  is  that  what  little  water  there  is
(relative to demand) is not found in the areas of highest usage. Economic development was
driven  by  the  presence  of  commodities  such  as  gold,  coal  and  diamonds  so  that  urban
development is not aligned with water availability. Gauteng Province, where the largest urban
area, Johannesburg, is located, accounts for around 33% of the country’s GDP and 49.6% of
all employee remuneration in the country and accommodates just over a fifth of the country’s
population. But this region has fragile water resources.  Gauteng Province is located on a
watershed which means that outflows of wastewater pollute the water resources on which it
depends (WWF 2014a).
Despite severe constraints, the country has managed to achieve a high level of water security
relative to water availability due to engineering projects with a well-developed system of dams
(both major ones and municipal and farm dams) as well as micro-level boreholes and small-
scale irrigation schemes. There is an extensive water infrastructure which enables the
country to manage long periods of drought (WWF 2014b) and dams divert water to where it is
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most used. Gauteng imports 88% of its water from a series of complex transfer schemes (at
considerable cost) and relies on water from Lesotho via the Lesotho Highlands Water Project
(LHWP). The Project was launched in 1998 and in 2014 work began on Phase II which is due to
be operational in 2022 (Africa Research Bulletin  2014).
2.2 Water policy
Before the end of apartheid in 1994, access to water was racially segregated and concentrated
in the hands of the white minority population. At the end of the 19 th century, most of the water
used in South Africa was for white commercial agriculture. Water for irrigation was generally
diverted directly from rivers since few dams had been constructed. Legislation protected the
water rights of farmers located along the rivers. Expanding industrialisation led to the 1956
Water Act (Act 54) which was intended to ensure an equitable distribution for industrial and
other competing uses and to authorise strict control over the abstraction, use, supply,
distribution and pollution of water. With the expansion of mining post WWII, large inter-basin
transfer schemes were set up including the LHWP (DWAF 1994).
Under the apartheid system infrastructure investments served the white community while
other areas were left to fare for themselves. Jurisdiction over water followed the geographical
segregation of the regime. Commercial farmers were well served by the apartheid
government and rights were primarily vested in riparian land holders. Meanwhile, a total of
ten  Bantustan  or  Bantu  homelands  were  established  where  land  was  set  aside  for  black
residents. These were densely populated with high rates of poverty. Under apartheid, formal
water authority was under the Homeland governments but tribal chiefs played an important
role (Koppen et al 2002). In 1994, virtually 100% of the Indian and 99.9% of the white population
had access to safe water. The figure for the coloured population was 95.4% while only 43.3%
of the black population had access to safe water (DWAF 1994 White Paper).
Water in black areas was under-resourced, in part due to non-payment. According to DWAF
lack  of  political  legitimacy  of  the  homeland  governments,  meant  that  it  was  impossible  to
enforce any tariff policy and so the homeland budgets became increasingly absorbed into the
payment of operating subsidies. With inefficient management in the black townships, “the
meager services which did exist in the townships could not survive the protracted boycotts
which black civil society resorted to as one of the last remaining tools of resistance before the
fall of apartheid”(DWAF 1994, p.5).
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With  the  election  of  the  ANC  Government  in  1994  came  national  reform  with  the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), described as (para 1.1.1) “an integrated,
coherent socio-economic policy framework” which aims to “mobilise all our people and our
country’s resources toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic,
non-racial and non-sexist future”. One of the key programmes of the RDP (para 1.4.2) was
meeting basic needs including jobs, land, housing water, electricity, telecommunications,
transport,  health  care  and  social  welfare.  Improving  access  to  water  was  an  important
component of the RDP objectives of eradicating poverty and promoting sustainable economic
and social development.
Water policy in 1994, was set out in a White Paper in light of the RDP. As with the RDP, the
policy aimed to curtail the vast inequities of the apartheid era (DWAF 1994, p.1):
In a country with nuclear power, cellular telephones and vast inter-catchment water
transfer schemes, more than 12 million people do not have access to an adequate
supply  of  potable  water…The  goal  of  Government  is  thus  to  ensure  that  all  South
Africans have access to essential basic water supply and sanitation services at a cost
which is affordable to both the household and to the country as a whole.
The White Paper continues (p.4):
This inequity in access to water has a simple origin. The public funds available for water
supply  development  have  been  invested  mainly  to  assure  that  bulk  supplies  are
available to those who can afford to exploit them.
The 1994 water policy had eight policy principles: Development should be demand driven and
community based; basic services are a human right; “Some for All” rather than “All for Some”;
equitable regional allocation of development resources; water has economic value; the user
pays; integrated development; environmental integrity (DWAF 1994, p.8).
The 1994 White Paper established some core principles in water policy that have continued
for the past twenty years. First, the approach to equity took the form of meeting basic needs.
The policy as set out in 1994 was to ensure that all South Africans have access to basic water
supply  and  sanitation  services  within  seven  years  or  less.  The  White  Paper  provided  a
definition of a basic water supply: 25 litres per person per day (considered to be the minimum
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required for direct consumption, preparation of food and personal hygiene – not considered
adequate for full healthy and productive life which is why it is considered as a minimum). The
maximum distance a person should have to cart water to their dwelling is 200 metres although
this may be reduced in steep terrain. The flow of water should not be less than 10 litres a
minute and should be available on a regular, daily basis.
Second, financial sustainability was a core element of policy. A key principle of the RDP was
that services should be provided and paid for in a manner which does not require ongoing
government funds. DWA (1994, p.18): “The basic policy of government is that services should
be self-financing at a local and regional level. The only exception to this is that, where poor
communities are not able to afford basic services, Government may subsidise the cost of
construction of basic minimum services but not the operating, maintenance or replacement
costs”. There was provision for subsidies to be made available to communities which cannot
otherwise afford minimum services (p.18). They will only cover the cost of minimum service
provision and will not cover operating and maintenance costs and the subsidy value will be
determined by the actual cost of providing the service. Provision of services to lower income
households is, then, separated as with the basic needs approach. This leads to a framework
where those that can, finance their own services while those that cannot are to receive
government subsidy.
Third, the idea of cost recovery pricing was emphasized, based on concepts of scarcity both in
terms of finance (the government has not got enough funds) and water (economic pricing will
mean that water use will reflect the true cost). In addition, cost recovery was built on the idea
that people would have more interest in the welfare of a service for which they have to pay
(DWAF 1994, p.7):
an insistence that disadvantaged people should pay for improved water services may
seem harsh but the evidence indicates that the worst possible approach is to regard
poor people as having no resources. This leads to people being treated as the objects
rather than as the subjects of development.
And later (p.22):
Communities must pay for their operating and maintenance costs to ensure both
equity and sustainability. Where communities do not pay, and Government must cover
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these costs on their behalf, the result is a rapid reduction in finances available for the
development of basic services for those citizens who have nothing…if the community
expects some outside agency to be responsible for keeping their supplies going, they
will have no control over the processes and lose leverage and ownership.
Responsibility for keeping the service going is placed with a remote authority and
accountability is lost. This will have an impact on the reliability of the supplies since
the person who has to carry water everyday is likely to be far more interested in the
sustainability of the village water scheme than some remote Government official.
Privatisation  was  not  a  core  part  of  the  1994  policy  although  the  envisaged  institutional
framework was one where the government was a facilitator rather than a provider of primary
services. Government should “create an environment within which locally based
organisations can plan, construct and manage their own services. These can include both
local government institutions as well as specialized utilities operating on a commercial but
accountable basis”. There was a potential but unspecified role for the private sector: “The
private sector represents a vast resource which must be harnessed to contribute to the
implementation of this [water] policy in a variety of areas including: capital investment,
operation and maintenance, training and capacity building, organization development,
financing and commercial services”.
The RDP was followed a couple of years later by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR) in 1996 which was along more neoliberal lines.3 Following advice from the World Bank,
the  IMF  and  other  donors  (with  heavy  lobbying  from  water  MNCs,)  the  South  African
government drastically decreased grants and subsidies to local municipalities and city
councils and supported the development of financial instruments for privatised delivery.4 For
McKinley (2005, p. 182), this “effectively forced local government to turn to the
commercialization and privatization of basic services as a means of generating the revenue
no longer provided by the state”. In the late 1990s, some local governments began to privatize
and/or corporatize public water utilities by entering into service and management
partnerships with multi national water companies.
A  revised  White  Paper  on  Water  Policy  in  1997  set  out  in  more  detail  the  principles  of
allocation. Water required to meet basic needs and maintain environmental sustainability will
be guaranteed as a right while other water uses “will be subject to a system of allocation that
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promotes use which is optimal for the achievement of equitable and sustainable economic
and social development”. The White Paper proposes (2.1.4) a reform to the water law as “the
right  to  equality  requires  equitable  access  by  all  South  Africans  to  and  benefit  from  the
nation’s water resources, and an end to discrimination with regard to access to water on the
basis of race, class or gender”. A further White Paper in 2002 (DWAF 2002) set out more scope
for decentralization of service provision and government grants to support poor households
and to provide for the Free Basic Water Policy including the Municipal Infrastructure Grant
(MIG) and the  Equitable Share Grant, discussed below.
2.3 Legislation
According to the Human Rights Commission, South Africa has one of the most progressive
legislative and policy frameworks for basic services in the world  (SAHRC 2014 p.28). It is one
of the few countries where the right to water is enshrined in the national Constitution which
reads  (Section  27  (1)  (b)):  “Everyone  has  the  right  to  have  access  to  …  sufficient  food  and
water”. There are two core pieces of legislation which govern the provision of water. First, the
National Water Act, 1998 (Act No 36 of 1998) is the main legal instrument relating to water
resources. The Act creates a legal framework for the management of resources to include
rivers,  streams,  dams  and  groundwater  and  this  is  the  responsibility  of  the  national
government. The guiding principles (Chapter 1) are “sustainability and equity” in the
“protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of water resources”
The Act seeks to ensure that the country’s water resources are protected, used, developed,
conserved, managed and controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner for the benefit of
all people and assigns the national government as the public trustee of the water resources
(DWA 2013c). With the new law, the government abolished the former system of riparian rights
and took over responsibility for water management and with the abolition of the Homelands,
DWAF’s  jurisdiction  became  national.  According  to  van  Koppen  et  al  (2002),  while  the  Act
provides potentially for radical changes, achieving these depends on DWAF’s interpretation of
the Act and in controlling water use by high volume users.
Second, the Water Services Act (1997) is  the  primary  legal  instrument  relating  to  the
accessibility and provision of water services and covers drinking water and sanitation services
supplied by municipalities to households and other municipal water users. This is intended to
secure the right of access to a “basic water supply and basic sanitation”. The Act stipulates
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that Water Service Authorities have a duty to ensure efficient, affordable, economical and
sustainable access to water services for all consumers or potential consumers in its area of
jurisdiction.
The elements of the 1998 NWA are implemented or operationalised via the country’s National
Water Resource Strategy. The first water strategy (NWRS1) was formulated in 2004. This has
since been superseded by NWRS2 in 2013 (DWA 2013b). NWRS2 emerged as a result of the
Government’s 2010 National Development Plan (NDP) and outlines the strategy to meet the
goals set in the NDP that are related to water, providing targets through to 2035. The overall
objectives of the NDP are to eliminate poverty, deliver environmental protection and promote
economic development by 2030. NWRS2 is centred on three main concepts (DWA 2013b, p.12):
– Water supports development and the elimination of poverty and inequality. This applies
to equality in access to services, to resources and to benefits from water resources.
– Water contributes to the economy and job creation. The NDP has targeted the creation of
11 million jobs by 2030. Water is critical to such employment expansion across sectors.
– Water is protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled sustainably and
equitably.
According to NWRS2, equity is the one principle of the National Water Act that has not received
adequate attention and little substantive progress has been achieved since the promulgation
of the 1998 NWA (DWA 2012b, p. 45). However, as before, this is less about fair distribution
than about covering basic needs: “The principle of equity means that special attention must
be given to the needs of those that were historically denied access to water or the economic
benefits of water”. In part to address equity issues, the Water Allocation Reform (WAR)
programme was established by DWA. Under the WAR, water can be set aside in a catchment
for allocation to black and women users. Another element of the programme is compulsory
licensing where all the water uses in an area are reviewed and water is reallocated according
to specific imperatives, needs and requirements. Initial findings from the WAR programme
indicate  that  allocations  are  still  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  previously  advantaged  (DWA
2012b,  p.46).  Water  allocations  are  tied  in  with  the  country’s  contentious  land  reform
programme (see below).
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The 2013 Strategy continues to place considerable importance on the economic value of
water, at least when it comes to rhetoric: “the value of water resources must be recognized
from an economic point of view and the social and environmental benefits of the resource: it
is important that society recognizes determining the economic value of water, accounting for
the use of water (for example household water supply and irrigation for agriculture) and the
ecosystem services provided or supported by water resources” (DWA 2013b p. 43). This is
however difficult to achieve in practice with competing uses for water and no obvious mode of
evaluating these. What is the economic value of water for a household compared with water
for a gold mine or for an ecosystem? In practice, the potential conflicts in these complex
conceptual issues. For example, there is a drive for economic expansion in the NDP in order
to create jobs for the relatively unskilled with structured redistribution. The NDP proposes
expanding the mining sector and sees the agricultural sector as having the potential to create
one million new jobs by 2030. This requires a 50% increase in land under irrigation. However,
this proposed expansion of agricultural activity fails to recognise that there may not be enough
water available to fulfill this goal (WWF 2014a; WWF 2014b).
3 Consumption by sector
Water in South Africa is an important resource for agricultural and industrial production as
well as for household consumption. It is vital for sustaining livelihoods and promoting
economic and social development. However, there is competition for access and consumption
across sectors. Irrigated agriculture is the main user of water in South Africa, accounting for
around 60% of use (Table 1). While mining, industry and electricity generation account for a
smaller proportion, these are of major economic weight in the country and they also have a
significant impact on water quality. Many (eg the UN, the FAO, the World Economic Forum)
now talk in terms of a Food-Water-Energy nexus which recognizes that these sectors are
interrelated.5Water production and distribution requires energy. Energy production requires
water and food production mostly requires energy and water. In South Africa, this picture of
interdependencies across sectors is complicated further by energy and agriculture being
among the sectors which have most responsibility for water pollution in the country (WWF
2014a). The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is concerned about the increasing water-allocation
trade-offs between agricultural production, energy generation, industrial development and
urban residential consumption.
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Table 1: Proportional water use per main economic sector (%)
%
Agriculture / irrigation 61
Municipal / Domestic 24
Industrial 3
Afforestation 3




Source: DWA 2013b, p.9
South Africa’s commercial agriculture production is heavily dependent on irrigation. Only 12%
of the land is considered suitable for growing unirrigated, rain-fed crops. Irrigation accounts
for  90%  of  vegetable,  fruit  and  wine  production.  Although  only  1.5%  of  the  land  is  under
irrigation this accounts for 30% of the country’s crops. With limited arable land, the only way
to increase the capacity of the sector is with irrigation. The NDP proposes a 50% increase in
irrigated land at the same time as the DWA estimates a 1.75% water shortfall by 2025 (WWF
2014a).  More  intensive  farming  has  led  to  pollution  of  ground  and  surface  water,  loss  of
biodiversity, loss of soil fertility and erosion (WWF 2014b). Decreased water availability leads
to risks for irrigation and for the whole agro-industrial sector (WWF 2014a). Illegal water
abstractions especially  by irrigation farmers present serious problems in the sector (DWA
2013b p.72 and see below).
In 1994, almost 90 percent of the land in SA was owned by white South Africans who made up
less than 10% of the population. Land reform has been one of the thorniest issues to address
in improving equality in the country. Agriculture still continues to be dominated by large white-
owned farms. However, as part of the drive to improve equity the most recent water strategy
proposes  equitable  water  pricing  which  includes  financial  support  for  water  based  rural
livelihoods.
Mining and industry are key economic sectors in the country and are expected to drive
economic growth. They require significant quantities of water. Resources are set aside for
their use. Sasol, for example, a large energy and chemical company, depends on large
volumes of water for washing, extraction and cooling during production processes. The South
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African government allocates 150million m  to  the  company  every  year,  120million  m  of
which comes from the Vaal River, which provides water to Gauteng Province. 6  Mining
(particularly for coal and platinum) is expanding but these new mines are located in water
scarce catchments (for example in the Lephalale and Steelpoort Valley areas). Water scarcity
is said to be restricting the mining industry. Press reports indicate that mining companies are
having to reconsider expansion projects and work on improving water efficiency because of
water constraints in the country.7
Mining has been a major source of water pollution and is the main contributor to water quality
problems (although much of the damage stems from a time when less stringent conditions
were imposed on mine discharges before the promulgation of the National Water Act (DWA
2013b)). Acid mine drainage (AMD) has been reported in a number of areas in South Africa,
including the Witwatersrand Gold Fields, the Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal Coal Fields and
the O’Kiep Copper District (DWA 2013 p. 9). More than 6,000 mines have been abandoned in
South Africa with damage from acidic water requiring an estimated R30bn in clean up costs.
Thousands of abandoned and derelict mine workings continue to pose a water pollution threat
(DWA 2013). The notion of the polluter pays principle is difficult to apply when companies have
left mining sites and/or gone bankrupt,8 and illegal miners continue to use disused mining
shafts.9
Coal production, from mining through to power generation, requires vast volumes of water
and puts high pressure on groundwater quality and quantity. 10   South Africa is heavily
dependent on coal, both for electricity production and for export. Coal accounts for 86% of
electricity generation (WWF 2014a). Eskom, the state owned power utility which generates
92%  of  South  Africa’s  electricity,  uses  around  270m  m  of water per year for power
generation, which is about 2% of the country’s total water consumption (WWF 2014b). The
generation and power generation is regarded as a water use of strategic importance (DWA
2010;  DWA  2013b).  An  elaborate  and  sophisticated  network  of  water  transfer  and  storage
schemes has been developed specifically to support this sector and ensure high levels of
reliability.
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Eskom, is also committed to two new large coal-fired plants (Medupi and Kusile) to deal with
South Africa’s pressing energy needs. The capacity of these two plants is expected to be higher
than the capacity of all the other coal fired plants currently in existence (WWF 2014b). Demand
for South African coal is set to increase with expansion projects by Eskom and Sasol as well
as exports of coal to India, China and the European Union.11 New mines are rapidly being
established and there is a high number of pending mining applications for new coal mines to
satisfy Eskom’s increased demand. Most of these mines are in the upper reaches of the Vaal
River’s catchment which supplies Gauteng Province. According to the bulk water producer for
the region, there is a risk that this mining will “destroy the lifeline of Rand Water’s consumers
if pollution cannot be curtailed” (RW 2013 p.83).
While  the  DWA  recognises  that  water  scarcity  is  a  challenge  for  energy  production  and
recommends dry-cooling technology at new power plants, more could be done to shift
reliance away from coal.  According to the WWF, the DWA has failed to insist on a transition
to water-free renewable technology “because electricity is seen as a high-value economic use
of water, the allocation of water to Eskom’s power station is considered as being of strategic
importance and is an unquestionable priority” (WWF 2014b, p. 24).
Water quality has far-reaching effects. Declining quality is a major concern with potential
adverse impact on food for domestic consumption and for export. Dangerous levels of water
pollution can be disastrous and destroy local agriculture (taking jobs with it), drive up the cost
of cleaning the water and increase demands on energy for water purification, and increase
costs. “The most vulnerable will be the small-scale farmers who will be unable to install
water-filtration devices and will have no option but to draw from increasingly polluted
sources” (WWF 2014a p.25).
The WWF (2014a) provide the example of the Western Cape which accounts for 25% of the
agricultural sector’s total gross income and more than 50% of the exported produce of the
country. During the 2004/2005 export season, production came under threat due to salinity,
nutrient enrichment and microbial pollution of the Berg River. With water quality falling below
the EU microbial standards for food production, overseas retailers threatened to cancel fruit
imports. The potential loss of the export market is estimated at anything between R190m and
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R570m. Municipal and provincial governments are now working to improve water quality in
this catchment. If South African produce no longer meets international food-quality
standards, there will be constraints on job creation in the agricultural sector and jobs will be
lost (WWF 2014a).
4 Production of Raw water
Across the country, water management is the responsibility of one of nine regional Catchment
Management Agencies (CMAs).12 These are responsible for water resources in a designated
Water Management Area (WMA) (Figure 1). The CMAs are in the process of being established.
Only two are currently operational, with DWA managing responsibilities in the other seven
until they are up and running. The CMA is required to devise a Catchment Management
Strategy (CMS).
Figure 1: Water Management Areas in South Africa
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Source: DWA 2O13b
Raw water comes from surface and (under) ground sources and often requires infrastructure
to be accessed (such as dams and boreholes). According to the DBSA Water Strategy (p.2),
there  are  over  500  large  dams and  25  existing  inter-basin  schemes  in  South  Africa  which
enable the transfer of water from one catchment to another to align supply with demand.
Users of raw water include large industries, mines and irrigators that take water directly from
surface or ground sources. Other users may take water to process and sell on, such as bulk
water companies and municipalities. All water users are required to register with the Ministry.
Each registered user is allocated a registered water use volume and is required to pay for raw
water.  To work out the charge,  the total  cost  of  activities is  divided by the total  registered
water  use  volumes  to  reach  a  unit  charge.  This  is  multiplied  by  the  registered  water  use
volume to reach a billed figure for each user.
In  2013  the  DWA  brought  out  a  draft  revised  pricing  strategy  for  raw  water  (2013d).  This
strategy is underpinned by the following principles (p.2-3):
– Economic development – water is obviously important for this.
– Enabling equitable economic development – the pricing strategy is  intended to support
new economic development and promote national aims in this regard.
– Social equity – “The water use charges coupled to the granting of financial assistance will
contribute to social equity and redress of the imbalances of the past, both with respect to
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equitable access to water supply services through municipalities and water boards and
direct access to raw water for resource poor farmers and tree growers.”
– Ecological sustainability – charges need to cover the management activities required to
ensure maintenance of ecosystems.
– Financial sustainability –  “water  pricing  must  be  based  on  sound  business  principles,
recognising that where, for social equity, environmental or affordability reasons, water
management cannot be sustainably financed from specific water users, the shortfall must
be recovered from the fiscus or through cross-subsidisation”
– Economic efficiency – “In the context of water scarcity, ensuring an efficiency allocation of
scarce water resources requires that the price of water is set to reflect its scarcity value,
to ensure, firstly that water is conserved and secondly that some water used for low-value
purposes is redirected to alternative high value purposes”.
– Polluter pays and user pays – polluters and users must pay for the costs of their water
(taking into account the need for targeted subsidies where users or polluters are not able
to afford the full costs of these.
– Equity and affordability – water use charges need to take account of this with respect to
poor, marginalised and historically disadvantaged communities.
This pricing strategy moves on from the three principles that underpinned the original Water
Act: sustainability, equity and efficiency. The revised strategy states that of all the principles
that were enshrined in the original Water Act, the one that has been most neglected is equity.
However there are tensions in these objectives for example there may be trade offs between
water for economic development and equity. It is not clear how these will be addressed. The
revised strategy proposes that raw water charges are allocated to end users which are
grouped into the following categories:
· High assurance use
· Municipal (divided into metros, small towns and poor rural municipalities);
· Industry/mining;
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· Agriculture (with some differentiation for poor farmers and tree growers);
· Stream flow reduction activities; and
· Hydropower.
The water users which come under the “high assurance user” category are assured a water
supply which is equal to 99.5% which means that they should get their full supply of water for
all but one year out of two hundred. Those in the high assurance category include Sasol and
(probably) Eskom but details of these are not easy to find. The energy sector is a strategic
water  consumer  requiring  maximum  possible  assurance  (DWA  2010  p.11).  The  price  is
structured so that it reflects higher supply security. Those in the high assurance bracket pay
a higher proportion of costs. Municipal is in the same category as industry and mining in terms
of supply assurance (and cost). These users have a higher assurance of supply than
agriculture but less than that of the high assurance consumers (DWA 2013d, p.13).
The pricing of raw water covers the costs of abstraction, water resources management and
infrastructure. Where they use water from a specific infrastructure scheme, users also pay a
charge based on the cost of the scheme which is distributed among the registered users pro
rata according to the amount of water they are licensed to use (see TCTA below). The price
also includes a charge known as a “return on assets” but this is not a return in the financing
sense so much as a charge to raise finance for future infrastructure development. The RoA is
set to be replaced by a “Future Infrastructure Build Charge” (FIBC) which is a more accurate
description of the nature of the charge. There are proposals also for a Basic Human Needs
Water Resources Charge (BWC) in raw water pricing which will be calculated on the basis of
the volume of water required in a municipality to provide 50 litres per person per day for the
indigent  population  according  to  the  Stats  South  Africa  figures.  This  charge  would  be
calculated on a national basis so the total national cost of such provision will be divided by the
total national municipal volumes and then allocated across municipalities, to be paid by
municipalities or by Water Boards that supply municipalities. There are provisions for poorer
municipalities to pay a smaller percentage of this charge with the balance is paid by the state
budget (DWA 2013d, p. 12).
The current pricing strategy includes caps on raw water charges for some types of consumer,
notably irrigation. The revised strategy proposes that these subsidies are better targeted, and
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that they should include support for “resource poor farmers”, for commercial farmers, for
the BWC shortfall and for the backlog in infrastructure refurbishment. These subsidies,
instead of taking the form of lower water charges will be funded from general taxation (DWA
2013d, p.18).
Charges are scheme based. 13  So  an  average  tariff  is  charged  at  the  scheme  level.  For
example, water use from an interconnected infrastructure such as the Western Cape system,
which serves the City of Cape Town, is charged at a flat rate for the scheme. Here, all users
that draw water from an interconnected system would pay the same charge in terms of both
the infrastructure and WRM charges. New infrastructure costs are allocated across the whole
system rather than just paid by new users. Agricultural users pay irrigation raw water tariffs. 14
There are considerable challenges in applying the principles of raw water pricing in practice.
As mentioned above, some users take priority over others. The high assurance users pay for
a more secure supply. This may mean that economic power carries more weight than equity
in water distribution. And on a practical level, the allocation of charges is based on licensed
rather than actual consumption. Consultants Pegasys (2013), in their review of the sector,
recommend that this system is replaced with a metering system and there are regulations
under development that will require compulsory metering or measurement for raw water
users in order to have an accurate account of the nation’s water resources and consumption
(Pegasys  2013  p.5).   But  there  are  challenges  in  metering  raw  water  due  to  the  cost  of
installing meters and because some infrastructure, such as boreholes, is impossible to meter
(Pegasys 2013).
Many water users take water directly from ground and surface water sources, and there is a
problem with illegal abstraction. The DWA has environmental inspectors (known as the ‘Blue
Scorpions’) to enforce compliance with water-use licenses although their effectiveness is
called into question in the media.15 The WWF is also concerned about illegal abstraction: “In
many cases poor water resource management is not due to the lack of adequate policies but
rather to poor implementation and enforcement. Inadequate enforcement of the National
Water Act means that South Africa’s already stressed resource is further compromised”
(WWF 2014a, p.23).
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According to NWRS2 (p.63), national water infrastructure refers to schemes that are of wider
importance than local schemes because they transfer water across national boundaries or
between management areas, serve multiple use sectors or large geographic areas, comprise
several interconnected catchments or serve a strategic purpose such as the generation of
electricity for the national grid. This is managed by two entities: TCTA and the Water Trading
Entity.
4.1 Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA)
The biggest infrastructure project in the country and in the region is the Lesotho Highlands
Water  Project  (LHWP)  by  which  water  is  diverted  from  the  Kingdom  of  Lesotho  to  supply
Gauteng Province. The project transfers water from Lesotho via a series of dams and transfer
tunnels using associated power stations. The project is governed by a treaty between South
Africa and Lesotho. TCTA, state owned enterprise, is the implementing authority for the South
African side of the project.
Initially  the  project  was  financed  using  the  public  budget  but,  in  1986,  the  TCTA  was
established to seek alternative funding for LWHP. TCTA now arranges financing for other
large  raw  water  infrastructure  projects  in  the  country.  While  LWHP  provided  the  original
mandate for TCTA, the organisation now has a further 15 directives including providing
advisory services to water boards  (Annual Report 2014). The TCTA 2014 Annual Report lists
an extensive range of projects which include large-scale construction (such as the LWHP,
Berg Water Project, Olifants River Water Resources Development Project, the Mooi-Mgeni
Transfer Scheme Phase 2) and advisory (for example to Umgeni Water) activities.
Mostly, TCTA’s role is restricted to arranging funding for projects that can recover their costs
directly through charges to end users, so this is only used for projects that are considered
“economically viable” (DWA 2013b). This is described as “off-budget” financing. Before capital
can be raised in this way, off-take agreements must be signed by the commercial recipients
of the water, specifying the amount they will take at a price set for the duration of the project.
Capital investment requires prior negotiations with future users before a project can start. All
projects are ring-fenced and there is no cross subsidisation (Pegasys 2012, P.48).
The first TCTA project (the LWHP) was backed by an explicit government guarantee on debt.
Subsequent projects rely on implicit guarantees where TCTA debt appears on the state’s
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national  balance  sheet  as  a  contingent  liability.  DWA signs  an  income agreement  with  the
TCTA which provides an implicit guarantee and this reduces the risk for TCTA investments.
TCTA raises financing via issuing nominal debt in the South African capital market, long-term
loans from local banks and loans from local and international development financial
institutions. TCTA liabilities include bonds, CPI-linked bonds, commercial paper, fixed rate
loans (local), fixed rate loans (foreign), variable rate loans (local), trade and other payables
(TCTA AR 2014, p.154) and these are attached to each project. There is little foreign financing
(less than 2% of the entire project financing). Domestic finance is accessed via a ‘commercial
paper programme’ and other loans. TCTA also borrows from DBSA and EIB for some projects
(including LHWP). TCTA is not completely financially independent. In 2013/14, TCTA obtained
around  87%  of  funds  from  tariffs  (down  slightly  from  89%  in  the  previous  year)  with  the
balance received from DWA transfers (TCTA Annual Report 2014).
TCTA pays construction, operating and finance costs for the infrastructure projects. Funds
are repaid via a Capital Unit Charge (CUC) which is then billed and collected from users by
DWA and then transferred to the TCTA (Pegasys 2012, p.37, DWA 2013d). Charges are set at a
rate that will repay the debt while ensuring long-term stability of charges. As debt is repaid,
new projects can be undertaken (Pegasys 2012, p.49). TCTA does not make profits. Charges
to end users are those of actual costs incurred. Surpluses are accumulated as changes in
equity but TCTA does not pay dividends.
A tariff structure is established for each project which is aimed to ensure break-even revenue
with regard to costs over a specified period. According to the TCTA Annual Report, key
principles applied in determining an appropriate tariff structure include: end user
affordability,  predictability  and  constant  tariff  in  real  terms.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this
research project  to determine whether the detailed pricing structure is  in practice able to
match these principles but there is potentially considerable ambiguity, for example, in
accounting for historical costs.
TCTA uses derivatives to hedge risk exposure which is mainly risk of changes in foreign
currency exchange on the repayment of foreign loans and interest rate changes. A proportion
of TCTA borrowings is at a fixed rates of interest and the proportion varies from project to
project. TCTA tries to mitigate against the credit risk associated with derivative instruments
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by negotiating agreements with “various market-makers” (TCTA Annual Report 2014, p. 177).
The financial activities of TCTA are for risk mitigation rather than financial speculation.
The TCTA financing structure means that the costs incurred in financing infrastructure are
passed on directly to the users. The TCTA website provides two reasons for financing works
off-budget:16
1. To ensure that the cost of the infrastructure is paid for by the benefitting end
consumer and not by the entire tax base; and
2. To reduce government borrowing requirements
This  is  based  on  the  principles  of  user  pays  and  cost  recovery  so  that  those  that  use  the
infrastructure are the ones that pay for it and full costs are recovered. The consumers of TCTA
water include mines, industry, farmers and water boards. Costs are shared among these. But
these are different kinds of consumers. Water boards do not consume water like the other
categories. They treat and process water before selling it on, also to mines and industry but
mainly to municipalities. These then provide water to households. At each stage of production
there are additional costs and prices increase, as this paper shows. The effect then of this
approach  to  raw water  pricing  is  that  those  that  consume bulk  water  at  an  early  stage  in
production  pay  a  lower  price  than  those  at  the  end  of  the  value-chain  which  is  where
households are located.
Substantial  further investment is  required in the water sector.  According to NWRS2 (DWA
2012b p. 84), capital investment in new water infrastructure and refurbishment is projected
to require an estimated R700 billion over the next 10 years (R70 billion a year) compared with
the current amount of R30 billion a year. The Strategy envisages mobilizing private sector
finance for the “economically viable portion of water resource development; that is water
supplies to users who can afford to repay loan finance, such as industries, mines and power
generation and domestic users receiving high levels of water services” (NWRS2 DWA 2012b,
p. 86). This approach which largely by-passes government spending (although there are some
DWA transfers) also means that wealthy (‘economically viable’) users do not have to engage
with government financing but are encouraged to contribute to separate private financial
structures. While the Strategy includes a social element, this is limited to encouraging the
private sector to contribute towards the social component of infrastructure investment where
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they  use  water  from  the  same  infrastructure.  So,  mines  will  be  “encouraged”  to  invest  a
portion of their corporate social investment obligation in water infrastructure for the benefit
of the communities from which they draw their labour force but presumably encouragement
is not legally enforceable. This approach to financing is in contrast to the integrated pooling
of finance observed elsewhere, for example in vertically integrated water utilities.
4.2 Water Trading Entity
While the TCTA manages off-budget national infrastructure, the Water Trading Entity (part of
DWA and formerly the Water Trading Account) is the means by which the government finances
water  and  sanitation  (Treasury  2014a).  Funds  for  the  WTE  come  from  revenue  that  is
generated from raw water charges and it gets some government funding via the National
Water Resource Infrastructure Programme. The water resources management charges cover
the operational costs of all water management areas (DWA 2013c). This is known as on-budget
financing and is the government budget complement to the off-budget financing provided by
TCTA. In 2006 it became the WTE and was intended to manage the recovery of usage costs to
ensure the long-term sustainability of the country’s water resources (DWA 2013c).
The WTE has two components (DWA 2013c): water resources management which manages
water quality, conservation and allocation of water through CMAs (and through proto CMAs
located in regional offices where these are not yet established) and infrastructure
management that oversees the operations and maintenance of existing water infrastructure
as well as the development of new infrastructure.
The WTE provides budget finance to national water resources. It maintains and funds new
infrastructure for bulk raw water such as dams, canals and reservoirs. The WTE also provides
finance for regional bulk infrastructure and support for local government to manage water
services. The WTE fund transfers are based on claims made by the WTE to the DWA. Around
86% of the funds transferred are for infrastructure development with the balance spent of
operational costs of the WTE and servicing loans for Komati River Basin for the Driekoppies
and Maguga Dams situated on the borders of South Africa and Swaziland (Treasury 2014a).
The WTE is not at present recovering costs so is not breaking even. In part this is related to
the lack of cost recovery for municipalities and water boards (see below). However, financial
management weaknesses persist within WTE including incomplete and inaccurate database
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of registered and licensed water users; inaccurate or absent water meters; inaccurate and
out of date billing information and non-enforcement of obligations to pay due to failings in
debtor management (DWA 2012b p.86). According to the NWRS2, it is recognized that the WTE
is not the most appropriate or efficient institutional arrangement for managing national water
infrastructure and there are plans to establish an alternative National Water Resources
Infrastructure institutional model for developing, financing and managing national water
infrastructure (DWA 2012b, p. 59).
4.3 Government grants
In  addition  to  the  national  infrastructure  entities  (WTE and  TCTA)  there  are  some smaller
government grants to develop infrastructure required to connect or augment a water
resource to infrastructure serving extensive areas across municipal boundaries or large
regional bulk infrastructure serving numerous communities over a large area within a
municipality.  For example, the Regional Bulk Infrastructure Grant (RBIG) was established in
2007 providing up to R5,738bn over six years from 2007/08 to support capital funding for the
social component of new bulk infrastructure. Other grants for the sector are discussed below.
5 Production – bulk water
South Africa currently has 12 Water Boards (WBs) and these are responsible for bulk potable
water supply schemes, buying raw water and selling water to municipalities and industries.
They also operate some retail infrastructure and wastewater systems (DWA 2013). A WB may
serve several municipalities and it will operate a number of water infrastructure “schemes.”
Water produced by bulk water providers is then distributed to Water Management Institutions
(WMIs) which may be Water Service Providers (WSPs) or a local municipality.
These WBs are independent state entities and the government is the sole shareholder.
According to the 1994 White Paper, the WBs are expected to be run on a self financing, non-
profit basis as independent financially viable institutions. The 1997 Water Services Act sets
out the primary activity of WBs which is to provide water services to other water services
institutions within its service area (para 29). WBs set and enforce general conditions including
tariffs. They are required to prepare a policy statement and an annual five-year business plan.
Section 34 (1) reads “…a water board must achieve a balance between –
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(a) striving to provide efficient, reliable and sustainable water services;
(b) optimally using available resources;
(c) striving to be financially viable;
(d) promoting the efficiency of water services authorities;
(e) taking cognizance of the needs of water services institutions, consumers and users;
(f) taking into account national and provincial policies, objects and developments;
(g) acting in an equitable, transparent and fair manner;
(h) complying with health and environmental policies; and
(i) taking reasonable measures to promote water conservation
So, while WBs are encouraged to be financially independent, the Act acknowledges that there
are policy trade offs. WBs are largely self financing but some receive government subsidies
and some raise debt finance. In practice, WBs vary greatly in their size and in technical and
financial capacity and this in part derives from the area which they serve. Rand Water, which
covers the economically active Gauteng province, is as large as all the other WBs put together
(Pegasys 2012, p. 48) and has consistently made a surplus and has accumulated reserves.
Similarly,  Umgeni  Water  which  serves  Durban  and  the  rest  of  KwaZulu-Natal  has  made  a
profit for the past five years (Umgeni Annual Report 2014). Other regions and WBs are less
prosperous and rely on government support. Botshelo Water which provides water services
to schemes in areas of the North West Province which were previously under the homeland
of Bophuthatswana receives almost 73% of total subsidies disbursed by the DWA (DWA 2014).
Rand Water and Umgeni Water issue bonds on the capital markets. 17 Others borrow from
banks. Mhlathuze Water ‘s main credit facility is with ABSA Bank.18 In 2002 the Treasury
issued guidelines limiting the borrowing powers of Water Boards and they need to obtain
National Treasury permission if they wish to exceed their borrowing limits. The aggregated
debt:equity levels have been reduced from 175% in 2004 to around 50% in 2011. Aggregate
long-term debt has decreased from R7bn to R3bn between 2004 and 2011 while equity levels
have  almost  tripled  over  the  same  period.  This  is  mainly  attributable  to  Rand  Water  and
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Umgeni Water reducing their debt levels substantially (Pegasys 2012). While financialisation
is not deeply embedded in the sector, a review by SALGA in 2013 indicated that a number of
WBs  were  seeking  prices  to  provide  a  higher  net  profit  margin  than  previously.  The
justification for a higher margin is the need to obtain or maintain a minimum interest rate
cover to satisfy lenders (SALGA 2013, p.8).
5.1 Bulk water tariffs
WBs set their own tariffs and requests for tariff increases are reviewed by the Treasury
under the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA 2003). They are required to consult
with the municipalities on proposed increases. However, at a meeting of the Parliamentary
Monitoring Group (PMG) in 2013, the South African Local Government Association (SALGA)
felt that some WBs had not fulfilled their requirements in this regard.19
The tariffs charged are based on the input costs. WBs charge a flat fee across all users which
includes charges for raw water, electricity, chemical treatment, labour and capital
investment. For example Umgeni Water raw water costs increased sharply to cover the
Capital Unit Charge for the Spring Grove Dam in 2012.20 However, there is no consistent policy
for the setting of bulk tariffs. And there are some state subsidies available for bulk water via
the Regional Bulk Infrastructure Grant so it is not clear to what extent the tariffs reflect costs.
Table 2 shows the bulk water tariffs for 2013/14 for the 12 Water Boards. There is
considerable variation with Amatola Water the highest and twice the price of the Mhlathuze
Water tariff.




Amatola Water 7.55 0.69
Bloem Water 4.37 0.40







Rand Water 5.52 0.50
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WBs are largely reliant on revenue from the sales of water. Debt collection is a major concern
for most WB. The financial sustainability of some is threatened by the high value of amounts
owed  by  municipalities.  According  to  Sigwasa  (2011),  total  arrears  for  municipal  debt
amounted to 10.5% of total sales. Table 3 lists the WBs and shows the province where they
are located (although the geographical boundaries of the WBs go across provinces).









Amatola Water Eastern Cape 15.9 1.9 125
Bloem Water Free State 75.7 9.3 52



















Mhlathuze Water KwaZulu-Natal 7.6 0.9 37
Overberg Water Western Cape 0.9 0.1 79







Rand Water Gauteng 626.9 77.5 37
Umgeni Water KwaZulu-Natal 156.4 19.3 40
TOTAL 2,120.3 262.1
Source: Pegasys 2012 *DWA 2014
Table 3 shows the amounts owed to WBs by municipalities in 2011. Total municipal debts
amounted to around US$262m. However, the absolute value of debts does not necessarily
indicate the financial health of the WB. Rand Water has the highest amount outstanding, but
debtors’ days (which measures how long it takes to collect cash from debtors) are among the
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lowest. Meanwhile other WBs have a more problematic debt profile (Amatola, Sedibeng
Botshelo, Bushbuckridge and Lepelle (Haswell 2012).
In addition to the high levels of unpaid municipal bills, the financial sustainability of WBs faces
challenges from customers obtaining water from other sources. Amatola WB for example,
sells more than 70% of the water to one customer - Buffalo City (East London) and there is a
risk  in  that  Buffalo  City  is  reducing  demand  from  Amatola  Water  Board  and  planning  to
increase its own supply (DWA 2014). Similarly, around 77.1% of the sales of Umgeni Water are
to  the  Durban  water  utility,  eThekwini.  Future  sales  for  Umgeni  are  predicted  to  drop  in
2019/20 as a result of the commissioning by eThekwini Municipality of their own wastewater
reuse plants.22
Rand  Water  has  started  taking  over  the  operations  of  the  poorly  performing  WB
Bushbuckridge as part of sectoral reform. The 12 existing WBs are in the process of being
consolidated into nine Regional Water Utilities (RWUs) so some are in the process of being
‘de-established.’ The RWUs are to be operational by 2015, according to the provisions of the
NWRS2. They will manage bulk water services and bulk sanitation for wastewater treatment
(DWA 2014).
5.2 Rand Water
Rand Water is by far the biggest WB in South Africa and the largest utility in Africa, supplying
Gauteng and parts of the Free State, Mpumalanga and the Northwest province (RW 2013). The
Rand  Water  supply  area  generates  60%  of  South  Africa’s  GDP  and  10%  of  the  whole
continent’s  GDP  (Rand  Water  2013,  p.83).  The  WB’s  primary  function  is  the  abstraction,
purification and distribution of bulk potable water which is almost all from the Vaal dam which
it pumps to booster pumping stations and from there to reservoirs and to customers. Rand
Water (like all the WBs) is owned by the Government of South Africa through the DWA and this
relationship  is  governed  by  the  provisions  of  the  1997  Water  Services  Act.  The  Board  is
appointed by the Minister for Water Affairs.
The main source of income for Rand Water is from the sale of bulk potable water to local
municipalities. Approximately 90% of the Group’s revenue is attributable to sales transactions
with six major customers (RW 2013). Rand Water lists its customers as follows: three out of
the country’s eight metropolitan councils (Ekurhuleni Metro, Tshwane Metro, which includes
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Pretoria, and Johannesburg Metro), 15 municipalities, the Royal Bafokeng administration, 45
mines and approximately 771 industries and direct consumers23 and see Table 4.
Table 4: Rand Water customer base
Customer %









Rand Water recovers all operational costs, as well as some rehabilitation and replacement
projects, from the tariffs set and internally generated funds. In 2012/13, the tariff increased
by 11.3% (RW 2013, p.169) compared with a CPI rate of inflation of 5.5% in October 2012.24  The
main costs drivers are raw water and energy costs. Rand Water funds its capital expenditure
programme through internal resources (accumulated profits and cash reserves). Additional
funding requirements are met through the raising of funds in the debt capital market and
other external sources (RW2013 p.34). The company has accumulated reserves in 2014 of
R9750 million (USD843million). In 2013, RW’s gearing (debt to equity) level was 22%, up from
20% in 2012 and 14% in 2011 and significantly below their target of 50% reflecting substantial
capacity  to  fund  future  spending  (RW 2013,  p.170).  The  company  has  a  stand-alone  credit
rating of BBB+ which is better than that of its shareholder, the Republic of South Africa. The
replacement asset value is estimated to be R80bn and at least 60% of this is located in pipeline
infrastructure (RW2013).
In  common with  the  other  WBs,  Rand  Water  has  a  big  problem with  unpaid  bills.  In  2012,
outstanding debts amounted to around US$75m (R831m) (RW 2013). However, debts are
recovered relatively quickly (Table 3) and the company is regarded as being in “an excellent
financial position, which is not surprising as it is serving the most economically well off part
of South Africa” (DWA 2014 p.13).
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6 Production municipalities
6.1 Overview
Water is provided to end-users by Water Services Authorities (WSAs) (that is if the end user
does not obtain raw water directly or bulk water direct from a WB).  A WSA is defined as “any
municipality responsible for ensuring access to water service”25 including a district or rural
council as defined in the Local Government Transition Act, 1993 (Act No. 209 of 1993). The
country has 152 WSAs (Table 5). Municipalities receive water from Water Boards and they
also have their own dams, boreholes and springs, water treatment plants and waste water
systems. There are three classifications of WSA. Table 5 shows distribution of the 152 WSAs
in the country, eight of which are classified as metros.






Eastern Cape 5 9 2 16
Free State 0 19 1 20
Gauteng 0 7 3 10
KwaZulu Natal 10 3 1 14
Limpopo 4 7 0 11
Mpumalanga 0 18 0 18
Northern Cape 0 27 0 27
North West 2 9 0 11
Western Cape 0 24 1 25
Total 21 123 8 152
Source: DWA 2013 Strategic Overview of the Water Sector in South Africa 2013
WSAs are able to subcontract water services to private providers. However privatization has
not been widespread. Despite the legislative commitment of the ANC to commercialization
and  privatization  of  water  after  taking  office  (McDonald  and  Ruiters  2004),  and  extensive
pressure from donors and private companies, there is now little private sector involvement in
municipal water. Some contracts have expired and others were terminated early. Three
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contracts signed in the Eastern Cape in 1999 were either terminated or not renewed (Ruiters
2004). Johannesburg had a management contract with French multinational, Suez for five
years  from 2001  but  this  was  not  extended  when  it  expired  in  2006.  There  are  some BOT
contracts, for example with WSSA, but mostly the provision of water is under the control of
municipal government.
The two long-term contracts still remaining have been consolidated into a single owner. In
1999 the Nelspruit Local Authority contracted UK firm Biwater to provide water services for
30 years in the Greater Nelspruit Water Concession, the first of its kind in the South African
water sector. While the contract has led to increases in investment and access, it was initially
unpopular due to strong payment enforcement practices in low-income areas (Smith et al
(2004).  Also in 1999 Siza Water Company owned by French company Saur,  was awarded a
concession contract to supply water in Dolphin Coast for 30 years, buying bulk water from
Umgeni Water. Initially the contract was not profitable due in part to the poor state of existing
infrastructure and lower than expected demand. More recently, a growth in residential and
business property in the area has increased profits and the contract is stable. Both of these
concessions were taken over by Cascal in 2007 which was in 2012 bought out by Sembcorp, a
Singapore based global conglomerate 49.5% of which is owned by Temasek Holdings, an
investment company owned by the Government of Singapore, and 50.5% of which is publicly
listed. The Greater Nelspruit Utility Company is now known as Sembcorp Silulumanzi and
water services in Dolphin Coast are now provided by Sembcorp Siza Water Ltd.26
Even where activities are delegated to a WSP, the WSA retains responsibility for the provision
of water. WSAs are required to develop a five year Water Services Development Plan (WSDP).
This must show how the WSA will provide universal access to water services including the
eradication of historical backlogs within its area of jurisdiction and the WSA must report
annually  on  progress  with  regard  to  the  WSDP  (DWA  2013).  The  DWA  monitors  the
performance of WSS with a Municipal Strategic Self-assessment (MSSA) to check the “overall
business health of a municipality  / WSA and identify key areas of vulnerability”. Sixteen key
areas of service performance vulnerability within a WSA are assessed including infrastructure
management, drinking water quality, revenue collection, and customer care (DWA 2013, p.
34).
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6.2 Municipal Finance
Water is just one of several services provided by municipalities. The municipality’s accounts
present bulk purchases of water and electricity as cost items along with other expenditures
and sales of electricity and water come under the “income” heading for the municipality (see
for  example  SSA  2014a).  Water  charges  go  into  the  general  finance  pool  for  municipal
revenue, and service costs come out of the general expenses. So the delivery of water and
electricity and other municipal services can subsidise one another. Municipal finance for
water and sanitation comes almost entirely from government grants, from borrowing and
from end users. Each of these is discussed below.
6.2.1 Central government grants
Municipalities are supposed to charge ‘cost reflective’ tariffs for water but central government
funds are targeted at service delivery for poor households through a mixture of equitable
share  and  conditional  grant  funds  (Kenyon  2013).  The  DWA’s  total  budget  increased  from
R10.2bn in 2013/14 to R12.4bn in 2014/15 and R15.5bn in 2015/16, boosted by several water
infrastructure improvement and rejuvenation programmes. These are part of the country’s
National Infrastructure Plan announced in 2012 which sets out nineteen Strategic Integrated
Projects (SIPs). Water and sanitation come under SIP 18 which aims to “address the estimated
backlog  of  adequate  water  to  supply  1.4m  households  and  2.1m  households  to  basic
sanitation.”27 As part of SIP 18, in 2013 it was announced that the DWA was to roll out R4.3bn
as  part  of  its  Interim  Water  Supply  Programme  (IWSP)  aimed  to  address  the  backlogs  in
municipal water-related service delivery. This was to be funded via the Municipal Water
Infrastructure Grant (MWIG) which was introduced in 2013/14. 28  This  is  distinct  from  the
Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) which was approved in 2003 and aims to provide all South
Africans  with  a  basic  level  of  services  and  which  also  includes  R7.1  billion  for  water  and
sanitation (Kenyon 2013).
The  MWIG,  introduced  in  2013/14  is  a  conditional  grant  in  the  sense  that  it  is  targeted
specifically at expanding the reach of the network to unconnected, low-income households
and  businesses  that  serve  low-income  communities  (SAHRC  2104  p.56).  The  MIG  aims  to
support the planning, acceleration and implementation of various projects that will ensure
that water is supplied to communities identified as not receiving a basic water supply services,
particularly those in rural areas. The aim is to focus on the 24 district municipalities with the
highest backlogs. Projects must be identified by municipalities and form part of their
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Integrated Development Plan And Water Services Development Plan (DWA 2013a). However,
in  July  2014  it  was  reported  that  municipalities  had  been  under-spending  on  the  MIG  –
discussed below.
The Equitable Share Grant (ESG) in contrast to the MIG and MWIG, is an unconditional grant.
It  is  based  on  the  idea  from  the  Constitution  that  each  sphere  of  government  –  national,
provincial and local – is entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally to enable
it to provide basic services and perform its functions. Since 1998, the equitable division of
revenue takes into account the functions assigned to each part of government and its capacity
to self-finance through its own receipts and revenues. The equitable share is an unconditional
allocation in that local government determines how it is spent compared with conditional
grants which are attached to specific policies and programmes of national departments.29
A revised formula for establishing the Equitable Share was proposed in 2013. In discussions
of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group in February 2013, the new formula proposed was to
provide a subsidy amount for each poor household (below a specified income threshold) to
provide water, sanitation, refuse removal, energy and included an amount of 10% to cover
maintenance. Allocations were based on the number of households and the grant is to be
adjusted to take account of the revenue-raising capacity of municipalities. The impact of the
new formula is  to increase the proportion of  the Equitable Share going to rural  areas and
municipalities. However, in discussions in Parliament, one of the significant issues discussed
was that within some municipalities there are highly unequal distributions so they have high
levels of both wealth and poverty and there is questionable scope for monitoring the way in
which municipal governments delivered their Equitable Share. 30 In addition, this grant is not
monitored and there are concerns that where municipalities face financial difficulties, they
use the equitable share for other expenses and then they do not have the funds to pay WBs
(Sigwasa 2011).
Other grants related to water include the Urban Settlements Development Grant, the Rural
Households Infrastructure Grant, the Water Services Operating Subsidy and the Regional Bulk
Infrastructure Grant (see Kenyon 2013 for more details). The recent expansion of grants to
municipalities comes in the wake of a period of declining local financing. According to Bond
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(2014b),  after  1994,  there  was  a  rise  in  national  funding  made  available  for  capital
expenditures on basic services. This included a World Bank designed capital grant including
hook ups to the water and electricity grids. But in the initial post-apartheid period this
occurred alongside a dramatic decline in operating and maintenance grants for
municipalities. So this is where decentralisation of state services translated into “unfunded
mandates” where the “central government commands that municipalities do more things with
fewer resources” (p.7).
6.2.2 Borrowing
WSAs are separate from the municipality but come under the control of the municipality. For
example, Johannesburg Water (JW) is owned by the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) which is its
only shareholder. Hence, financing for infrastructure development occurs at the level of the
municipality. Several pieces of legislation govern aspects of municipal borrowing, notably the
MFMA and its debt disclosure regulations as well as the PFMA. Section 45 of the MFMA allows
municipalities and municipal entities to incur short-term debt for bridging finance for
operational purposes only. This has to be recovered within the financial year in which the debt
is incurred. According to the National Treasury expenditure report, short-term debt
accounted for 6% of total municipal debt in 2010 - 70% of this being in the form of commercial
paper.31 This is a change from three years earlier when most short-term debt was simply in
the form of overdrafts. Section 46 of the MFMA permits long-term debt for capital expenditure
or the re-financing of certain existing long-term debt. The Treasury Expenditure Review
reports that long-term loans amount to approximately 64% of total local government debt.
Since 2004 the municipal bond market has expanded significantly due to the need for the
metro cities to finance large-scale infrastructure projects. Municipal bonds have been issued
by the cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni and in 2013 the City of Tshwane
raised  R1.39bn  in  its  debut  bond  issue  to  finance  capital  investment. 32   The  City  of
Johannesburg has successfully launched seven municipal bonds (Table 6).  The  City,  as  a
Government entity issues the bonds to the public, guaranteeing to pay interest (coupons) at
set periods and to repay the principal on a specified date. A total of over R8bn has been raised
via bond issues by the City (Table 6).
Table 6: Bonds issued by City of Johannesburg
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COJO1 13-Apr-10 230 11.95 1,000 153 Matured
COJO2 15-Sep-16 164 11.90 1,000 157 250
COJO3 26-Apr-13 154 9.70 700 157 135
COJO4 5-Jun-18 120 9.00 1,733 203 250
COJO5 5-Jun-23 230 12.21 2,286 208 230
COJO6 5-Dec-15 265 10.82 900 157 275
COJO7 21-Mar-21 195 10.78 850 208 195
http://www.joburg-archive.co.za/2009/pdfs/bonds/coj07_bond_issuance.pdf
The bond issuances are widely regarded as successful. COJO2, for example, was
oversubscribed 2.3 times and rated AA- by Fitch.  The objective of  this bond was to finance
capital expenditures for water, urban streets and electricity distribution projects; to refinance
outstanding high cost loans and reduce the overall interest rate on the city’s debt obligations;
to extend the maturity on the City’s debt to lower debt service payments; and diversify funding
sources. These bonds were not underwritten by government guarantees but there was a
partial  credit  guarantee (PCG) from the IFC and DBSA, so there is  donor support  for bond
financing.33 The PCG raised the bond’s credit rating three notches above the City’s standalone
rating.34 In 2014, it was reported that Johannesburg was planning to return to the market to
“lead a resurgence in municipal bond sales” to raise funds for infrastructure.35 Elsewhere it
was reported that bond sales were set to triple in 2014 to about 3bn Rand ($272m) as cities
tapped into debt markets to fund development.36
eThekwini Municipality in Durban, in contrast, has not made so much use of bond issues,
raising external borrowing mainly from South African banks, DBSA, EIB, AfD.  The municipality
has set out detailed guidelines for borrowing37 where it states that the Municipality will in
general seek to minimize its dependence on borrowings in order to reduce future revenue
committed to debt servicing and redemption charges. The municipality is required to maintain
a gearing ratio below 50% (p.4).
6.3 Revenue from end users
Water tariffs are set by municipalities on an annual basis. The 1997 Water Policy White paper
sets out a number of principles that need to be observed in water pricing. It states that “the
price paid for water by major users should progressively be raised to meet the full financial
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costs of making it available and to reflect its value to society” (6.5.1) and (6.5.2) “many of the
financial constraints faced in water resource development will be removed if the responsibility
for paying the costs of such development is accepted by users.” However it is recognised that
it is important “that the introduction of realistic pricing for water does not further penalise
disadvantaged communities who were already penalized during the apartheid era” and (6.5.3)
in relation to supply for basic human needs, the Government is to “encourage the adoption of
lifeline tariffs for water services to ensure that all South Africans can achieve access to basic
services.”
Municipalities are required to take into account the operational costs, capital repayments,
refurbishment and asset management needs. The DWA reviews the proposed tariffs (DWA
2013a). Although there is general guidance on what prices should involve, for example they
should be pro-poor, reflect the economic value of water, promote conservation, ensure
financial sustainability (e.g. see NWRS2 and DWA 2013a), it is difficult to find detailed guidance
on exactly how prices are set. In the 2012 mid-term budget for JW, it is stated that tariffs are
set “with a view of striking a balance between the interests of poor households, other
customers and ensuring the financial sustainability of the municipality” (CoJ 2012, p.26). For
the 2012 budget, the percentage increase in bulk prices from Eskom and Rand Water were
16% and 13.5% respectively which meant an increase in domestic tariffs at a rate higher than
inflation. 38 Table  7 and Table 8 show  the  tariffs  for  three  of  the  country’s  largest
municipalities Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. Each of these municipalities has an
Increasing Block Tariff (IBT) where different consumption volumes are charged at different
prices.
Table 7: Johannesburg water tariffs 2013/14 (excluding VAT)
Domestic metered Domestic prepaid
R/ m  US$/ m  R/ m  US$/ m 
>0to 6kl Free Free Free Free
>6 to 10kl 5.84 0.53 4.52 0.41
>10 to15kl 9.27 0.85 5.91 0.54
>15 to 20kl 12.91 1.18 10.7 0.98
>20 to 30kl 16.86 1.54 16.14 1.47
>30 to 40kl 17.88 1.63 17.13 1.56
>40kl 21.98 2.01 21.73 1.98
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Source: Johannesburg Water39
Since 2001, WSAs have been required to provide households with a basic level of water without
charge. This is the Free Basic Water (FBW) policy. Based on the amount of the basic minimum
consumption level of 25 l/c/p/d and a notional occupancy of eight per household, the FBW
policy requires that each household be provided with the first 6kl each month without charge.
WSAs  can  decide  whether  this  is  provided  universally  or  directed  to  those  that  qualify  as
‘indigents’ (see below) and different policies are applied. In Cape Town for example, indigent
households qualify for 4.5kl of water in addition to the 6kl FBW. In Durban, the first 9kl are
provided without charge.
Table 8: Water tariffs 2013/14 (excluding VAT)
EThekwini (Durban) Cape Town
Consumption R/ m  US$/ m  Consumption R/ m  US$/ m 
0 to 9 kl 0 0 0 to 6kl 0 0
9 to 25 8.37 0.76 6 to 10.5kl 7.60 0.69
25 to 30 11.46 1.05 10.5 to 20kl 11.61 1.06
0 to 45 25.24 2.30 20 to 35kl 17.20 1.57
>45 27.77 2.53 35 to 50kl 21.24 1.94
>50kl 28.01 2.56
Sources: eThekwini website40 and Cape Town Budget41
The municipalities are free to determine their own tariff structure (Burger and Jansen 2014),
and Table 7 and Table 8 show that the three metros have different approaches. Durban has
only four categories of  consumption after the FBW point  whereas Cape Town has five and
Johannesburg has six. Durban also has a higher volume of FBW but, thereafter, the charge
for all the other categories is higher than for the other two metros. For Johannesburg, the
prepaid meter users are charged at a lower rate for subsequent consumption units but once
consumption reaches more than 20m  the  unit  tariffs  are  similar  for  prepaid  and  other
meters. The prices at higher consumption levels show a considerable markup on the bulk
water price of R5.52 per m  which Johannesburg Water is charged by Rand Water (and this is
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also the rate paid by mining and industry consumers). Durban water pays R4.70 per m3 to
Umgeni Water (Table  2) and charges are then considerably higher to consumers after the
FBW 9kl threshold. Cape Town largely sources its own bulk water supply.
The idea behind the IBT tariff structure is that higher consumption users subsidise those
households  that  consume less  and  is  based  on  an  assumption  that  the  poor  will  use  less
water. However, this requires metering of services and can be regressive where lower income
households live in higher-density accommodation so that the tap consumption quickly goes
to the highest bracket, even if individual consumption is low. The average household size of
non-poor households in South Africa was 3.1 in 2011 compared with 5.1 for poor households
(SSA 2014b).
Burger and Jansen (2014) empirically assess the effectiveness of the subsidy element of the
IBT structure in South Africa. One obvious constraint in reaching the poorest households is
that the FBW and the IBT structure require the end user to have a water connection in the first
place. They show that even with a cross-subsidisation structure built into the IBT, where water
access is low, the subsidy will not reach the intended beneficiaries. The research by Burger
and Jansen (2014) shows that, while the wealthiest consumers contribute more with the IBT
structure,  in  terms  of  a  premium  paid  on  water  consumption,  mostly  this  is  captured  by
households in the middle of the income distribution rather than the poorest households. They
conclude that income distribution instruments are more effective if applied at a national level
due to disparities across locations.
6.4 Municipal challenges
Services are compromised by weak performance in the management of water supply and
sanitation provision (DWA 2013b). Most WSAs are not performing well. An assessment of
WSAs under the MSSA (6.1 above) in relation to 16 key performance indicators found that only
3% of  WSAs  (or  5  out  of  152)  were  classified  as  having  low (or  acceptable)  water  services
vulnerability. For 18%, vulnerability was classified as moderate; 33% were considered to be
high risk and 46% (or 70 out of 152) WSAs were classified as having very high water services
vulnerability. The most critical area of vulnerability was revenue collection. For 14% of WSAs,
water tariffs cover less than 50% of the operations and maintenance and refurbishment costs.
For 25% of  WSAs,  revenue collection was less than half  of  that  which was billed and 52%
reported an increase in debtors (DWA 2013e).
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Such capacity constraints at the local level severely limit the impact of sector policy and the
application of broader principles such as cost recovery and targeting of subsidies. Service
provision  can  become  trapped  in  a  downward  spiral  with  poorly  maintained,  aging
infrastructure coupled with weak financial management and limited funds for financing
investment.42 This leads to increased interruptions in supply and high levels of unaccounted
for water, poor management of wastewater treatment works resulting in deteriorating raw
water  quality  in  some  areas  (DWA  2013c).  Water  treatment  plants,  bulk  water  supply,
reticulation and water storage systems are not well maintained. Many are in disrepair across
the country and sanitation systems are often in a very poor condition. In many areas sewerage
systems and ventilated improved pits (VIPs) are no longer functional and municipalities have
not made an effort to repair them (SAHRC 2104).
Many municipalities do not have adequate staffing. An assessment of staff capacity found that
22% of the 152 WSAs had less than half of their posts within their technical staff organizational
organogram filled and 28% do not have sufficient network operations and repair staff (DWA
2013e). Weak staff capacity at the municipal level limits the impact of national programmes
as  grant  allocations  are  often  underspent.  In  a  Parliamentary  hearing  in  July  2014,  it  was
reported  that  the  causes  for  the  underspend  of  the  MIG  included  “the  lack  of  municipal
readiness to address extension of basic services to areas where there are no services
especially with regards to project prioritization and registration, lack of information regarding
basic service backlogs per ward/village in targeted municipalities, non-functional water
schemes, outdated sector plans, poor project preparation, lack of contract and project
management skills, poor financial management.”43
If  a  municipality  fails  to spend its allocated grant in a year there is  a great possibility  that
funding will be reduced in the following year. Weak capacity constrains monitoring of
contractors and increases the risk of corruption and maladministration. The municipalities
that  most  need  the  funds  are  the  least  able  to  spend  them  (SAHRC  2014).  The  weakest
municipalities  are  the  worst  affected.  According  to  a  WRC  study,  “municipalities  are
continuously in a crisis management mode with limited management information and poor
decision-making processes, financial and technical management” (McKenzie et al 2012 p x).
A high proportion of water is stolen, lost or leaking away in municipalities. An extensive study
submitted  to  the  Water  Research  Commission,  based  on  data  gathered  from  132
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municipalities throughout South Africa (representing over 75% of the total volume of
municipal water supply) shows that the level of non-revenue water (NRW) for the country as
a whole is 36.8%. Of this, 25.4% is considered to be lost through physical leakage (McKenzie
et al 2012). Table 9 shows the % NRW in the country’s eight Metros which account for 46% of
the country’s urban water use. However, such estimations are challenging when the quality
of the data presented by some municipalities was very poor.











Source: DWA 2013 p.40
Leakage and NRW can occur from leaking pipes. If services are metered, it is the end user
that bears the risk of losing water this way if a leak occurs on the consumer side of the meter
and this can result in high bills for households. An option, suggested for consumers in Durban,
is for domestic water customers to insure themselves against undetected underground leaks
by paying a monthly premium which is forwarded to a private insurance company.44
Municipalities have extensive outstanding debts. Table 10 shows that in June 2014 total
amounts owed to municipalities stood at R94bn (US$8.4bn). This level of debt was reported
to have caused “dismay” to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Finance at a briefing in
July 2014. Debts owed to municipalities in 2014 were R1bn more than in 2012/13.45 Gauteng
accounted for over 40% of the debt.
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Table 10: National debtors by province and metro, June 2014 (R'000)
Province Total % Metros Total
Eastern Cape 6,174,962 6.57 Buffalo City 1,106,950
Free State 9,055,990 9.63 Cape Town 6,459,106
Gauteng 41,119,671 43.73 Ekurthuleni Metro 10,736,264
KwaZuluNatal 10,142,031 10.79 EThekwini 5,293,463
Limpopo 3,504,902 3.73 City of Johannesburg 17,386,821
Mpumalanga 6,266,854 6.67 Mangaung 2,892,412
North West 6,977,923 7.42 Nelson Mandela Bay 2,376,541
Northern Cape 2,361,714 2.51 City of Tshwane 6,627,609
Western Cape 8,420,435 8.96 52,879,166
Total 94,024,482 100
Source: Treasury 2014b, p.21 and p.9
The country’s metropolitan municipalities were owed R52.9 billion in outstanding debt as at
30 June 2014, accounting for over half of the municipal debts, as shown in the columns on the
right of Table 10. Johannesburg accounts for over 30% of the debts owed to metros and 18%
of the debts owed to municipalities. Table 11 shows the total debts broken down into
categories. The municipal service with the highest amount outstanding is water, and unpaid
water bills account for over a quarter of the total municipal debt. Turning to the customer
group breakdown, most of the debt is due from households which account for over 60% of the
debt.  Without  going  into  further  breakdown of  the  debt  these  data  indicate  that  municipal
finances are constrained by the failure of households to pay their water bills. Water services
are contributing to high levels of household debts. Households have amassed substantial
debts in unpaid water bills.
Table 11: Debts outstanding by charge category
R’000 % R’000 %
Water 24,746,562 26.32 Households 57,892,837 61.57






Management 9,846,422 10.47 Other 11,879,083 12.63
Waste
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Source: Treasury 2014b, Table 18, p. 21.
In  its  analysis  of  the  data  in  these  above  tables,  Treasury  (2014b)  attributes  the
underperformance of collections against billed revenue to (among other things – not stated)
“the reduced affordability of municipal services by households”. The assessment continues:
“The economic slowdown and substantial increases associated with municipal cost drivers
such as fuel, bulk purchases (water and electricity) material etc are continuing to impact on
affordability and subsequently the ability of consumers to pay for services” (Treasury 2014b,
para 19, p. 3). Thus, notwithstanding the concerns regarding municipal capacity, services are
becoming less affordable.
This  is  a  view  supported  by  the  Local  Government  Association.  According  to  SALGA  in
consultation on tariffs in 2013, the tariffs charged by WBs are unaffordable (SALGA 2013). They
state:  “It  is  our  opinion  that  the  high  tariff  increases  is  a  contributing  factor  in  the
compounding debt owed to Water Boards by municipalities”. Half of the debt owed to
municipalities was over 120 days old. Their review of debts shows that the debts owed to
municipalities by consumers was seven times the debt owed to WBs. Furthermore, they state
that this pattern has been on-going for years such that if it continues, municipalities will not
be able to pay for both bulk water and electricity (SALGA 2013).
Municipalities are also creditors. At the end of June 2014 they owed a total of R25bn of which
R3.6bn (US$320m) was for bulk water (Table 12).
Table 12: Municipalities total creditors (June 2014)
R’000 %
Bulk electricity 7,036,309 28.03
Bulk Water 3,613,312 14.40
PAYE deductions 314,592 1.25
VAT -55,504 -0.22
Pensions 264,292 1.05
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Loans 1,925,845 7.67





Overall, then this suggests that the financing of water is potentially unstable given that it rests
on  payments  by  households  to  municipalities  who  then  pay  bulk  water  providers.  The
discussion above indicates that these links in the system are shaky due to a combination of
factors including weak capacity and low affordability. This overview of the whole chain
provided above shows how affordability constraints are compounded and the result is
potentially unstable. Note, however that this only relates to municipal water supply. Section 4
above shows that large volume users in agriculture, industry and mining are outside this part
of the sop.
7 Consumption and social policy
7.1 Access
According to the DWA (2013c) 94.8% of the population has safe access to water up from 59%
in 1994. However, a review of the breakdown of means of access over the past ten years
indicates that the proportion of the population receiving water piped into the dwelling has not
improved greatly (rising from 40.8% in 2002 to 45.3% in 2013) (Figure 2). The proportion using
water piped on site increased from 27.8% to 26.8% while 31.4% of the population used “other”
sources in 2002 compared with 27.9% in 2013.46 In terms of numbers, 12.8 million households
had access to piped water in 2013 compared with less than 9 million in 2004 (Treasury 2014c).
Figure 2: Source of water
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Source: Treasury (2014c) General household Survey: 2013
While overall trends indicate substantial increases in water access since 1994, Table 13
shows that there is considerable regional variation. Gauteng and Western Cape stand out
with a high proportion accessing water piped into their dwelling and very few without access.
The picture is reversed in other provinces with Limpopo with an overall rate of access of
around 73% of the population and Eastern Cape only 68%.
Table 13:  Access to water by province (% population)





























32.8 16.6 18.6 8.8 22.2 60.8
Free State 44.8 44.3 6.2 2.6 2.2 41.2
Gauteng 62.1 27.3 6.0 2.8 1.8 22.9
KwaZulu
Natal
40.0 23.6 14.8 7.6 14.1 56.6
Limpopo 18.4 33.9 20.5 13.2 14.0 63.8
Mpumalanga 35.7 36.0 9.2 6.6 12.6 52.1
North West 29.3 40.0 14.3 8.0 8.4 50.5
Northern
Cape
45.8 32.3 12.8 6.6 2.6 46.8
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Western
Cape
75.1 13.3 8.3 2.4 0.9 24.7
South Africa 46.3 27.1 11.7 6.2 8.8 45.5
Sources: SAHRC 2014, p38 citing 2011 Census data; *SSA 2014b
The areas with the lowest rates of access are also largely those with the reported poorest
water quality. Nationally, 63.2% of households rated the quality of water-related services they
received as ‘good.’  This proportion has been falling steadily since 2005 when 76.4% gave this
rating  for  their  services.  Residents  of  Free  State,  Mpumalanga  and  Eastern  Cape  have
consistently been the least satisfied with the quality of their water. These are also the areas
that have reported the most interruptions in service. The proportion of households that
reported  interruptions  in  services  for  more  than  two  days  at  a  time  was  highest  in
Mpumalanga (63.5%) and Limpopo (62.1%) while in Gauteng and Western Cape it was much
lower,  8.3% and 2.7%, respectively.  These provinces were also the most satisfied with the
quality of the water they received (Treasury 2014c).  So, while households may be registered
as having access this may not mean that water flows through piped connections. For example,
Mabeskraal, a village of 10,000 people in the North West, has water infrastructure but there
has not been piped water for three years!47
In addition, weak data mean that it may not even possible to know with accuracy the extent of
water access. The Human Rights Commission cites the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) to show
that while government statistics might indicate a high level of access to water and sanitation,
the norms and standards being used to ascertain access levels are flawed. “Many local and
provincial governments have no real understanding of how many people live in settlements,
particularly in informal settlements. Without having this information, it is impossible to
provide services to all” (SAHRC 2014, p.53).  Similarly the Social Justice Coalition has also
found discrepancies between reported access and conditions on the ground, with particular
reference to sanitation in Khayelitsha, a township on the outskirts of Cape Town. 48
Notwithstanding data limitations, many rural areas continue to lack access to water and
sanitation. In farming communities, households are reliant on the landowner for the provision
of basic services, and some farmworkers are unable to access water and sanitation where
this is at the discretion of the landowner. There have been cases where the owners cut off
supply to farmworkers. The Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) comes across this
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regularly. Livelihoods can be threatened further when livestock are deprived of water (SAHRC
2014). In rural areas, poor households are often dependent on their crops for food security. In
research carried out by the Human Rights Commission, it was reported by one farmer from
the Western Cape that there is water for richer white farmers while neighbouring poorer
farmers  do  not  have  water  (SAHRC  2014,  p.62).  In  urban  areas,  residents  of  informal
settlements can be difficult to reach with formal water services as households often do not
have proper housing or water and reticulation infrastructure (SAHRC 2014).
Table 13 shows that the provinces with the higher levels of poverty are unsurprisingly the
ones with the lowest rates of access. Within provinces, poor households have lower access to
water in their house or yard (53%) compared with 82% of non-poor households (SSA 2014b,
p.52). Levels of poverty are more than twice as high in rural areas and this is also reflected in
water access. In urban areas 89% of households had access to piped water inside their
dwelling or on site compared with only 39% of rural households. The incidence of poverty is
more prevalent among females and black Africans and rural areas (SSA 2014b). While water
policy has aimed to eradicate patterns of access based on race, gender and class, in practice,
the persistence of poverty in specific locations and among these groups means that inequity
in water access continues.
Furthermore, racial disparity persists in access to water. By 2012 only 40% of all black African
urban households and only 4% of rural black households had an indoor water supply while
almost 99% of whites have had this level of access for decades. Only 40.2% of black infants
live  in  a  home with  a  flush  toilet.  In  shack  areas,  hundreds  of  families  share  a  single  tap
(Ruiters 2014). Evidence from provincial hearings on access show that there are highly
impoverished communities in South Africa that were historically disadvantaged under
apartheid that remain without access to basic services. National averages seem to indicate
progress but disaggregated statistics show limited access in historically poor areas (SAHRC
2014). Despite the rhetoric of the Constitution and successive White Papers, in practice
reducing inequality in service delivery has been difficult to achieve.
Bond  (2014a)  describes  a  “width  not  depth  approach”  to  the  delivery  of  basic  services,
including housing, water/sanitation and electricity, meaning that the roll out of water services
was driven with a focus on quantity in terms of numbers connected rather than quality or
sustainability.  The  result  was  that  taps  were  often  located  far  from  homes  and  a  large
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proportion broke down when people attempted to access pipes for direct connections. The
DWA is aware of the need to do more to address social inequality: “despite the economic
growth within the country, a large proportion of the population remains excluded from the
formal economy, living in poverty and dependent on subsistence livelihoods and government
grants. The Department has an important role to play, in ensuring that these communities are
provided with safe drinking water and water for productive purposes in order to contribute to
the drive to eradicate poverty” (DWA 2013c, p.9).
7.2 Social Policy - Free Basic Water
In 2001 the Government introduced the Free Basic Water (FBW) policy. One of the triggers
was  reported  to  be  an  outbreak  of  cholera  in  2000-2001  in  KwaZulu-Natal  which  drew
attention to the lack of access faced by many due to pricing (Gowland-Gualtieri 2007). Durban
Metro Water Services is understood to have been one of the pioneers of the FBW policy in
South Africa, although, according to Loftus (2004), the FBW policy originated, not out of a drive
for social policy so much as a business case in that it was not cost effective for the municipality
to chase up bills for low levels of consumption.
While FBW is a national government policy, responsibility for implementation rests with the
local government. The FBW component is financed from the local government Equitable
Share (see above) and cross subsidisation from higher volume consumers. Government policy
states that all indigents49 are entitled to a supply of free basic water within a 200-metre radius
of the household.50 Some municipalities, including metros, provide free basic water for all
households while smaller municipalities provided for registered indigents only (Ruiters 2014).
Durban provides 9kl of water at no charge (Table 8). In Johannesburg there is a poverty index
and allocations of free basic services vary, depending on a person’s “poverty score” out of 100.
The supply of FBW can increase to between 10 and 15kl per month depending on the scale of
poverty.
The FBW policy has significant limitations. First, it is based on an assumed level of capacity
for the municipality and the consumer. Households need to have water meters. Research by
McKenzie et al (2012) found that the extensive development of RDP houses and informal
settlements often created substantial areas that were unmetered and remained without a
direct consumer for billing purposes. Where these areas are not metered they are sometimes
also not billed. Some housing projects are implemented by regional authorities without
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adequate communication with the local authorities. Larger municipalities such as the City of
Tshwane Metro have installed bulk meters for all water supplied to such developments and
informal areas and they hold the Department of Human Settlements responsible for payment.
According to McKenzie et al (2012) there is currently no consensus or standard method for
approaching similar cases which exist in many municipalities across the country.
Furthermore, the process of registering as indigent can be out of reach for the most
marginalised groups. Studies by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies show that the indigent
policy is only provided to those households that register as indigent so those that do not know
to register, do not qualify, and this applies to other targeted interventions (SAHRC 2014).  In
Johannesburg, the social package (a programme called Siyasizana) provides a “basket of
benefits” (including basic water, energy, sanitation and refuse removal) to those that qualify,
based on their level of poverty.  Any person earning less than R3,366 a month is encouraged
to register. Different levels of poverty quality for different levels of subsidy. Claimants need to
provide information on their income and as such, may qualify for different levels of support
depending into which of three income bands they fall. Registration takes place at specified
customer  service  centres  and  individuals  need  to  provide  a  South  African  ID  number  and
details of the property in which they live. Homeless people do not qualify for the benefits that
go to a property (water, electricity, rates, sanitation and refuse removal). 51  This process
therefore requires some administrative capacity on behalf of the claimant and those that are
homeless do not receive the basic level of services.
Second, the amount of water provided is supposed to be equivalent to 25 litres per person per
day in a household of eight people. This is equivalent to five baths per person per month or
two toilet flushes per day. This is not sufficient to meet basic human needs. The WHO states
that 20 litres pppd is  the minimum requirement for basic human survival  but 100 litres of
water are needed for completely adequate access. Vulnerable households are particularly
affected (e.g. those with HIV/AIDS (van Wijk 2003)); and poor households are typically higher
density. According to Bond and Dugard (2008) the government has never offered any evidence
that the six-kilolitre amount per household per month is an appropriate amount to meet basic
needs. They cite evidence that 50l is the minimum basic requirement for human needs of
drinking, sanitation and food preparation.
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The IBT structure means that prices increase steeply once the FBW amount is exhausted
Densely populated households can quickly find themselves consuming at the second block
tariff. According to Bond (2014b, p.9) in Durban, the overall cost of water ended up doubling
for poor households after the introduction of the FBW policy because of a huge price increase
in the second block after the first block in the IBT was used up. For poor people, this led to
consumption cuts by a third in the subsequent six years, from 22 to 15 kl/hh/m to 15 (Bond
2010).
Third, where consumers fail to pay their water bills they risk having their supply disconnected.
This can have the impact of wiping out the FBW policy. Bond and Dugard (2008) cite World
Bank advice to the first post-apartheid water minister, Kader Asmal, that there needed to be
a “credible threat” of cutting service if the country was going to attract private investment in
municipal water provision. Municipalities have been routinely disconnecting those that fail to
pay their bills.
According to the Declaration of the Coalition Against Water Privatisation (cited in Ruiters 2004,
p.167)  more  than  10  million  poor  families  had  had  their  water  services  cut  off  and  over  2
million had been evicted, often as part of the associated legal process to recover debt from
poor customers. 52  Research by Laila Smith in 2001 into debt management in Cape Town found
that between 1999 and 2001 159,866 households had their water cut off for non payment
(Smith 2004, p.182). Disconnection for non-payment leaves the household with no water at all
and those with outstanding water debt are not eligible for their allocation of free water until
their debt is paid off (Gowland-Gualtieri 2007).
Disconnections continue to be routine. In February 2014 it was reported that 26,305 customers
had been disconnected for non-payment of water and electricity accounts in Durban.53 In
Tshwane in November 2014, the Gauteng provincial government stepped in to bail out schools
that had had their water and electricity supplies disconnected.54
Municipalities state their disconnection policies clearly. The City of Johannesburg website
says that “the City is taking a tough line on non-payment of accounts”. If an account is more
than 30 days overdue, the account holder will be scheduled for a cutoff. To avoid public health
risks, instead of disconnecting households, their connection can be fitted with a ‘flow limiter’
to severely restrict the flow of water. The statement of Water Policy for Durban reads (p.5):55
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“In the case of domestic households, if there is no response from the customer, the water
supply  is  then  restricted  to  a  flow  of  one  litre  per  minute  through  the  use  of  a  specially
designed washer. This is done notwithstanding the high court judgment in our favour which
states  that  anyone  using  more  than  6kl  in  a  30  day  period  and  not  paying  for  the  extra
consumption charges forfeits their right to access 6kl of free basic water and can have their
water supply disconnected.”
When  water  is  disconnected,  this  can  have  a  catalytic  effect  on  the  bills  of  others.
Disconnected households have to beg borrow or steal water in order to have any access which
increases the bills  of  others and creates “a spiral  of  arrears in which more and more find
themselves having to manage an escalating household debt” (Loftus 2004, p.197). For Neil
MacLeod, Head of eThekwini, the water provider in Durban, in an interview with Loftus, these
problems remained ones of “a culture of entitlement in which people don’t respect the
economic value of water” (according to an interview with Loftus). For Loftus this approach is
based on a perception that households can afford water but choose not to pay whereas his
own research revealed that “poorer residents are painfully aware of the economic value of
water but unable to cope with the rising arrears they have amassed”(p.197).
In order to improve revenue management, some municipalities introduced prepayment
meters for water. This started in Soweto in 2003. Records show a ratio of unaccounted for
water  of  62%  in  the  area  in  2002  with  payment  levels  at  only  15%.  Although  there  was
supposed to be consultation, prepayment meters have met with considerable hostility,
particularly in areas with very high rates of unemployment and poverty (Harvey 2004). Without
meters, households were charged a flat rate based on a deemed consumption of 20kl per
household per month.
Prepayment meters are intended to solve the problems of debt collection for the municipality.
However, for households, once they have reached the limit of the water they can afford they
effectively disconnect themselves. This may help with debt management but the issues of
affordability and meeting basic needs remain. However, without the need for disconnection,
such households are less visible. Loftus (2005) provides a detailed account of the daily human
misery associated with life dominated by flow limiters and prepayment meters.
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Prepayment meters can be expensive and subject to technical faults. Heymans et al (2014)
document the use of prepayment meters in Mogale City, described as one of the pioneers of
prepaid  water,  where  more  than  10,000  meters  were  installed  in  the  late  1990s.  The
municipality prioritized two low income townships but from the start included affluent
residents of an exclusive new thousand unit housing estate in a mainly white suburb so that
prepaid meters did not get  stigmatized as only used by poor black families.  Installation of
prepaid meters was optional and was widely accepted. Politicians promoted the angle that
prepayment meters help poor households to manage their consumption and not get into debt.
However,  in  an  audit  in  2012,  the  municipality  found  on  inspection  of  nearly  a  third  of  all
prepaid meters, that, eight years after installation, more than 90% of the meters were faulty
and the vast majority was delivering free water. New meters have been installed at a cost of
US$270 each. Reviewing consumption in areas with prepayment meters, Heymans et al found
that users tended to monitor consumption carefully and stick to the 6kl FBW amount and so
paid nothing for water. There was then little revenue benefit from prepayment meters in low-
income areas although bad debt is preempted.
There have been extensive protests against the policy of disconnection and forced installation
of prepayment meters (see for example, von Schnitzler 2008). In 2007, five residents of Phiri,
a slum area of Soweto mounted a legal challenge against the City of Johannesburg claiming
that the forced installation of prepayment meters, as part of the City’s Operation Gcin’amazi,
was unlawful and unconstitutional. The initial ruling of the High Court found in favour of the
residents and the judge also ordered that the residents should be provided with 50 litres pcpd.
However this was overturned on appeal with a ruling that 42litres pcpd was sufficient and
prepayment meters were lawful.56
While the FBW policy has meant that some households are able to manage without paying for
water, this is not possible for larger households. Furthermore, prepayment meters present
an insurmountable barrier to water access that can be crippling. The Phiri legal case above
gained momentum after a fire in the township where two children died. The prepayment meter
automatically disconnected when the credit limit was reached, preventing neighbours from
extinguishing the fire. The tap in question was shared between nine people and the FBW
amount usually ran out around the 12th day of the month (Dugard 2008).
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Thus, the provision of a small allowance of FBW does not constitute a substitute for
comprehensive access to water and sanitation. Living with the risk of disconnection, flow
limiters and prepayment meters requires a different way of life, where water conservation
and re-use overshadow most aspects of everyday activities. According to Loftus (p.195) “In
effect, the provision of this lifeline supply of free water has provided something of a moral
justification for disconnections and restrictions and helped to fend off criticisms and reduce
the likelihood of community mobilizations”.
7.3 Why do people not pay for water?
Given the severe penalties associated with non-payment of water bills, the question remains,
why are so many not paying their bills? There seems to be clear evidence that fewer
households  are  paying  for  their  water.  According  to  the  2013  Census,  the  proportion  of
households who reported paying for water has been declining steadily over the past decade,
falling from 66.9% in 2004 to 44.5% in 2013.
Reference is often made to what is termed a “culture of non-payment” which derives from
protests in the apartheid era where black communities made a point of not paying utility bills
as a matter of protest. Many believe that this ethos continues today and there is a sense that
water is free so it should not be paid for. In the early stages of commercialization, protest
movements reconnected households which had had their water and electricity disconnected.
But analysis of the debts owed to municipalities in Table 9, above, indicates that nearly 80%
of household debts are more than 90 days old (Treasury 2014b). Assuming that the longer a
debt is outstanding, the greater the risk of disconnection, this debt profile suggests that
households are unable rather than unwilling to pay their debts.
Some municipalities report high losses due to illegal connections to the water network. In
2010 Durban introduced an amnesty so that residents with illegal connections could come
forward to have the connection regularised or to risk being caught and prosecuted. In
February 2014 it was reported that the amnesty had led to 2,616 households coming forward. 57
News reports suggested that such connections were not just in poor areas but could be found
in wealthy residential locations and business districts. 58  Clearly  then,  it  is  not  just  poor
households that do not pay their bills and non-payment can be associated with unwillingness
rather than inability to pay. Farrar (2012) attributes non-payment in part to what she terms
“Constantia Syndrome” by which poor people want to be able to use services that are suitable
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for wealthy households as in Constantia but they cannot afford the increased costs. The result
is high debts and disconnection.
While  the  above  reasons  may  be  a  factor  in  the  debts  owed  to  municipalities,  there  is
compelling evidence that water is not affordable for the majority of the country. According to
DWA (2014) it is generally accepted that households with an income of less than R38,200 pa
(approx R3,200 per month) are unable to pay for water. Around 63% of the households served
by the country’s 12 water boards has an income which is too low to be able to afford to pay for
water according to this criterion (DWA 2014 – see Table 14).







Bushbuckridge 195,500 155,621 80
Lepelle 1,285,762 998,130 78
Amatola Water 665,990 504,821 76
Sedibeng 563,727 405,112 72
Mhlathuze 463,409 330,982 71
Botshelo Water 499,295 350,613 70
Magalies 414,857 278,427 67
Bloem Water 340,713 222,545 65
Pelladrift 3,607 2,331 65
Umgeni 1,709,753 1,118,438 65
Overberg 39,701 21,092 53
Rand Water 4,582,738 2,448,686 53
South Africa 14,450,160 9,108,523 63
Source: DWA 2014, p.12, citing 2011 Census data
In practice, Table 14 indicates  that  water  is  unaffordable  for  most  of  households  in  the
country. In theory, these should qualify for basic services but as seen above this often misses
those most in need and is too low for most to live on and once the FBW is reached, prices
increase steeply for higher consumption levels. The result is high levels of household debt
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and municipalities that are reliant on central government subsidies. This affects the ability of
municipalities  to  pay  the  WB  for  bulk  charges  (DWA  2014).  This  widespread  lack  of
affordability compromises the rhetoric in the Constitution and legislation regarding the right
to basic services and commitment to redistribution.
8 Closing remarks
Twenty years after the end of apartheid, the system of provision for water and sanitation
continues along unequal lines. Mining and industrial communities and wealthy households
have easy access to water yet many in rural areas and informal settlements struggle to meet
their basic needs. Of all the principles that are supposed to have underpinned sector policy,
the equality element has been the least successful.
Weak state capacity is a significant constraint in the sector. The DWA struggles to fill posts
with a national lack of technically skilled and experienced people, and the management of
water services and bulk infrastructure is left to a diminishing number of qualified civil
engineers in local  government (WWF 2014a;  DWA 2013c).  There are state failings at  every
stage of the sop.59 The low skills base undermines policy throughout. How can cost recovery
be implemented when costs cannot be known with any accuracy? How can support be provided
for low-income households when it is not clear where these are located or what access and
consumption is taking place? Weak capacity also weakens the ability of the state to respond
to some of the environmental pressures (WWF 2014a).
The sector is fragmented and there is confusion and contradiction in the structuring of the
water sop. While the DWA is responsible for water resources, once the supply reaches the
municipality, responsibility rests with local government rather than water affairs. So DWA
provides water up to a point but then they have no control.60 The DWA recognises the need to
improve integration in the water sector, particularly in the way that the Department and Water
Boards  support  local  government  and  there  are  calls  for  greater  integration  and
intergovernmental coordination (DWA 2013c p.9).
However, there are deeper tensions and contradictions in the sector which shape outcomes.
Some government departments have more weight than others. According to WWF (2014a,
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p.25) the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) appears to be less
empowered than the Department of Energy when it comes to policymaking for the food-
energy-water nexus, and so the agricultural sector stands to lose the battle with the energy
sector for access to water. Meanwhile, the economic might of the mining industry is likely to
guarantee their continued water access despite the fundamental contradiction of continued
water-intensive mineral production in dry areas while national supplies are running low.
There is considerable awareness and even some discomfort on the part of the Government
concerning the continued inequality in the provision of water in the country. However, the
commitment to equity is based around meeting basic needs rather than redistribution. The
neoliberal emphasis on cost recovery and user pays is being imposed on a distinctly unequal
pre-existing physical and socio-economic infrastructure (notwithstanding government
investment in the sector).  If  water pricing is  going to be based on the principle of  full  cost
recovery, then those with an existing network connection, that can buy directly from water
boards  and  that  consume large  volumes  of  water  are  cheaper  to  serve.  The  result  is  that
mines and industrial consumers have water while households and businesses in low-income
areas do not.  Where pricing is  based on the principle of  the ‘user pays’  then consumption
continues unabated for those that can afford it, while those that cannot are forced to rely on
inadequate state handouts. The result is that inequality has become more entrenched while
the provision of basic needs softens the edges of the sop.
For Ruiters (2014), an approach that targets poor households with a view only to meeting basic
needs “tends to reinforce their exclusion from centres of power, public influence and culture.”
Indigent policies and other means tested benefits move away from universal provision
towards targeted interventions which create a commodified framework. Access to safe water
and other basic services cannot be considered in isolation from the spatial segregation of
communities where residential location shapes access to cultural capital, social networks as
well as differentiated public and private services in South Africa.
For the Government, one of the policy weaknesses has been the consideration of users as
separate consumer groups. Bulk raw water infrastructure has been planned for the needs of
a specific sector “to the exclusion of other water users” so that the planning of bulk water
infrastructure has not taken account of the water needs of communities and rural
households. 61  The result has been the construction of infrastructure and distribution
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networks that bypass these communities. Wealthy mineral production sits next to shack
housing where residents lack basic services. Civil unrest has been the result with strikes such
as that which preceded the shootings at Marikana.
However, inequality looks set to continue. Investment in the sector is urgently needed. The
water strategy aims to secure private finance be used for the segments that are economically
viable, via the TCTA. Meanwhile, Government transfers and grants will be used to finance the
portion of the infrastructure investment required for supplying water for social development
objectives, for example for new resource-poor farmers or the basic level of water for domestic
use (DWA 2013b p.85). This means that private finance will be used to provide infrastructure
for those that can afford it  while state finance will  be used to supply water to low-income
areas and households. This then moves away from more traditional financing strategies based
around taxation, redistribution and universalism to one where cream-skimming by the private
sector is actively encouraged. The resources of the wealthy / economically viable go into
servicing their needs directly rather than supporting sector-wide development. This strategic
separation of the haves from the have-nots seems unlikely to make much of a dent in the level
of inequality and looks set to create more, rather than less, exclusion.
The review of the sector in this paper suggests that the financing of water in South Africa rests
on very shaky foundations, given that water is unaffordable for most households and
municipal debts are rising. Yet the municipalities and WBs and financing agencies servicing
wealthy areas seem to have no problem accessing capital markets. Their credit ratings do not
seem to be tarnished by rising unpaid bills. We can only assume therefore that these water
providers are doing well in their sales to non-domestic customers. The “high assurance”
consumers  continue  to  access  water,  unaffected  by  the  deprivation  faced  by  many  in  the
country. Until these consumers are challenged to make a greater financial contribution to the
sector as a whole, there is unlikely to be much improvement in equity, despite the rhetoric of
the water strategy.
1 http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/p0302/p03022013.pdf
2 The World Resources Institute rankings of baseline water stress (which measures total annual water
withdrawals as a percentage of the total annual available blue water) ranks South Africa 65 th in the
world, falling into the category of “high water stress” (Gassert et al 2013).
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3 For more on RDP and GEAR see: http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/ricsa/confer/me99/procs/pro_terr.htm
4 “The Struggle Against Water Privatisation in South Africa” Anti-privatisation Forum and Coalition
Against Water Privatisation 13 January 2005. http://apf.org.za/spip.php?article80
5 See for example www.water-energy-food.org
6  “Finding  solutions  for  South  Africa’s  coal-fired  water  and  energy  problems”  The  Guardian  18
September 2014.
7 “Water paucity hampering South African mining industry” African Review of Business and Technology
16 October 2012.




10  “Finding  solutions  for  South  Africa’s  coal-fired  water  and  energy  problems”  The  Guardian  18
September 2014.
11 “Demand for Southern African coal set to increase” Creamer Media’s Mining Weekly, 5 th July 2013.
12 Until very recently there were nineteen but these have been condensed into nine: Limpopo, Olifants,
Inkomatie-Usuthu, Pongola-Umzimkulu, Vaal, Orange, Mzimvubu-Tsitskamma, Breede-Gouritz and
Berg-Olifants.
13 For 2014/15 charges see: http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Projects/WARMS/Revenue/WRI%20D&I.pdf
14 http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Projects/WARMS/Revenue/WRI%20Irr%202015-16.pdf
15 “Blue Scorpions understaffed: water thieves walk free” Infrastructure News 3rd July 2012
16 http://www.tcta.co.za/Aboutus/Pages/default.aspx
17 http://www.umgeni.co.za/services/bti.asp
18 Mhlathuze Water Annual Report 2012/13
19 “Interaction  with  Water  Trading  Entity,  Analysis  of  Water  Boards:  Input  by  Department  of  Water
Affairs, SALGO and National Treasury” Meeting of Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 17 April 2013.
20 “Prepare to pay more for services” IOL News 29 March 2012
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26 Sembcorp has an extensive utility portfolio including Bournemouth Water and Sembcorp Utilities in
UK.
27 http://www.gov.za/issues/national-infrastructure-plan




31 Commercial Paper is defined by Investopedia as “An unsecured, short-term debt instrument issued







34 Excerpt from FS Series #1: enabling sub-sovereign bond issuances
35 “Joburg to sell bonds in bid to raise funds for infrastructure” Bloomberg Business Day Live 24 April
2014.
36 “South Africa mulls infrastructure bonds in debt-market expansion” Bloomberg 22 October 204.










42 Parliamentary Monitoring Group: Fiscal Challenges in Municipalities and Support/Interventions by
COGTA and Auditor General, 16 July 2014 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20140716-fiscal-challenges-
in-municipalities-and-supportinterventions-cogta-and-auditor-general
43 Parliamentary Monitoring Group: Fiscal Challenges in Municipalities and Support/Interventions by
COGTA and Auditor General, 16 July 2014 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20140716-fiscal-challenges-
in-municipalities-and-supportinterventions-cogta-and-auditor-general
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45 “Committee dismayed by large debt owed to municipalities” Parliament News Release, 17 July 2014.
46 This includes borehole on site, rainwater tank on site, neighbour’s tap, public/communal tap, water
carrier/tanker, borehole off site, flowing water, stagnant water, well, spring and other SSA 2014, p. 42.
47 “Mabeskraal: Our water troubles still run deep” Mail and Guardian, 14 February 2014.
48 http://nu.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Social-Audit-report-final.pdf
49 The term “indigent” means “lacking the necessities of life”.
50 The Free Basic Services Policy commits to the following as well as the provision of FBW: at least a
VIP latrine; solid waste management; and 50kWh of electricity per household per month.
51 http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3432&Itemid=168
52 “The Struggle Against Water Privatisation in South Africa” Anti-privatisation Forum and Coalition
Against Water Privatisation 13 January 2005. http://apf.org.za/spip.php?article80
53 “EThekwini owed R1.7bn in debt arrears” iol news 17 January 2014.
54 http://sanews.gov.za/south-africa/gauteng-education-bails-out-disconnected-schools
55 “Water Policy” www.durban.gov.za
56 See court ruling, Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others, www.saflii.org
57 “Water amnesty policy pays off for Durban” IoL Property 5 February 2014.
58 “Thousands stealing water” The Witness, 19 June 2014.
59 The NWRS2 provides a list (DWA 2013b, p.86): Unacceptably high water leakages; Failure to meter
water supplied and other form of unaccounted for water; Poor infrastructure planning and poor
investments; Poor operation and maintenance; Pollution of the resource leading to unnecessarily high
water treatment costs; Corruption, tender fraud, maladministration and lack of governance; Failure of
local government to ring-fence the water sector finances and the diversion of funds allocated to water
to non-essential purposes; Inefficient institutional performance; Poor revenue and debt management;
Inefficient water pricing that results in under-recovery of costs; A misunderstanding of the free basic
water policy and the neglect to manage the quantity of water supplied in terms of the policy and the
poor maintenance of indigent registers.
60 “Carolina’s water woes indicate large structural problems” Mail and Guardian, 19 July 2012.
61 Department of Water Affairs General Notice, Notice 888 of 2013, No.36790
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